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Introduction. The Restatements and Why They Matter—An Issue of 
Policy and Uniformity in the Law   
 
 Restatements of the Law—the most significant project of the American Legal Institute 
(ALI)—have long been a mark of America’s shift toward uniformity in the law during the 
twentieth century. However, of principal concern, specifically, is the place of the Restatements in 
developing and shaping our modern conception of American legal practice. Studying the 
Restatements can help us to understand how the law is shaped and developed by a variety of 
different parties and interest groups, and the issues that arise from there.   
 In the case of the Restatement, our focus must begin with the legal academy: an elite 
group of educated counsel and academicians, practicing and advancing specific legal ideals and 
positions. Thus, our study will address the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the 
Restatement (Second) and (Third) of Torts. These Restatements address different legal practice 
areas but share a common interest in being adopted at the state level. Restatements, by virtue of 
their development, are not controlling law. Instead, in order to become operative and 
enforceable, they must be adopted by judges in state and federal courts. Their influence is driven 
by the fact that they were created and developed by our nation’s leading jurists and attorneys. 
Still, their existence and adoption raise a key question: how do we accept an expansive and 
uniform legal code that has been created outside of the democratic process? 
 As a policy concern, adoption of Restatement provisions can have a myriad of effects on 
legal outcomes in court cases. Each time that the law is changed through adoption and judicial 
remedy, the opportunities and remedies available to litigants change, and their interactions with 
the legal system are realized differently. The common law, then, has a crucial impact on how 
citizens interact with and seek recovery within our legal system. In the case of the Restatements, 
their adoption in many cases exits with the common law. However, on certain occasions, the 
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Restatements conflict with and overrule the common law. The policy implications when those 
moments arise are crucial to how we understand the development and change that occurs within 
our legal system, and how the legal system responds to the constraints and demands of cultural 
touchstones in the law. Likewise, the Restatements can afford us a valuable window into how the 
law does not merely reflect the will of the people generally. Instead, they both reflect the law and 
also suggest how the law might develop and force us to consider what the existence of our 
specific legal processes mean in terms of equity and justice.  
The Restatements can thus be understood as a powerful tool in the arsenal of sources and 
materials which contribute to the judicial decision-making process. They are not the sole impetus 
for legal change, but they are a critical one that is persuasive to the judges and the counsel who 
construct arguments and make legal change. To truly understand American law, one might 
undertake a thorough and considered study of the sources that lead to development and change. 
In the case of the Contracts and Torts Restatements considered here, they represent two major 
areas of legal development that both concern recovery: contract recovery for damages in notions 
such as business and profit, and torts in issues of harm and emotional distress. Both areas of the 
law have the ability to inflict serious harm on individual interest and, further, share a common 
interest in providing meaningful restitution that can confer justice. The courts here rely on the 
Restatement in order to define ambiguous and uncertain areas of the law and, in the case of 
damages, seek to explain how the legal community balances its interest in justice with specific 
policy positions.   
 Our study here will aim to consider the interactions and experiences of the Restatement at 
the state level. This is where, specifically in the area of the common law, uniformity becomes a 
central issue that can carry significant weight in advancing changes in the law. For contracts, 
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adjustments in the common law—and the potential for uniformity across state borders—raises 
contentious issues of reciprocity and insight into how business and corporate interests operate in 
the fragmentary legal system established by our Constitution. This study will begin with a survey 
of the Restatement’s history and development—and the varied and often contentious relationship 
that different sects of the legal academy have with its provisions. Even so, they share a common 
faith in uniformity and the increased efficiency in the administration of justice that model codes 
and Restatements can offer.   
Our study then turns to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in Connecticut and will 
consider the nexus of business interests with contract principles in a state known for significant 
operations in the insurance industry, which regularly operate across state borders and carry wide 
implications for reciprocity in the law. The Restatement of Contracts also presents a key 
implication: how does the legal system respond to the needs of corporate interests and how does 
the academy, in their Restatement project, balance competing interests across a variety of 
contract issues. What recovery is available to the contractor and contractee, the lessee and lessor, 
the lienor and lienee? The resolution of each of these questions is predicated on an understanding 
of the thought that goes into judicial decisions. In our case, Connecticut’s treatment and adoption 
of Restatement provisions reflects a careful balance but also an understanding of the law’s place 
in the development of uniformity. Considering closely the impact and interaction of the 
Restatement on Connecticut’s common law tradition helps us to realize both the power of 
influence in the development of the law and how we interact with our legal system. Further, from 
a policy perspective, the adoption of provisions of the Restatement of Contracts in Connecticut 
offers insight into how deliberate judicial decisions direct significant changes in the law. Each 
case, each decision, each set of facts presents a different legal issue that can be altered.   
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 Our study next turns to an assessment of the Restatement (Second) and (Third) of Torts 
and its influence on recovery by litigants in the state of Washington. Again, the focus here turns 
on how the law is shaped and developed by competing interests and policy concerns. Torts, in 
particular, is an area of the law that addresses how the courts respond to human injury and 
suffering. In this context, the damage to interests is not merely pecuniary—as in contracts—but 
instead turns on damages to emotional distress and suffering. Studying the Restatement in 
Washington allows us to examine progressive jurisprudence at work, in the case of certain 
provisions, and is emblematic of the interaction between the law and policy interests. In the 
majority of cases considered in the Restatement of Torts, the specific efforts at legal uniformity 
do not reflect the reality of the common law but instead reflect well the efforts of law aimed at 
progress.  
 Our study of the Restatement of Torts in Washington also speaks to the influence of the 
legal academy on our conceptions of recovery and what constitutes sufficient justice. If the 
Restatement sets the terms and boundaries of claims for emotional distress and the liability for 
defective products, our own democratic interests and concerns are, in many respects, severely 
curtailed. Understanding the Restatements, then, is key to realizing again how judicial decisions 
are often shaped by and responsive to the beliefs and concerns of selected individuals. The 
challenge then of the Restatement in Washington is rectifying our conception of an egalitarian 
legal system with the narrow confines and prescriptions of a uniform code. In the case of tort and 
tort reform, the Restatement has at varying points in time privileged particular interests. With 
that said, those interests often do attempt to capture or state what may be considered the policy 
position that affords some measure of justice in accordance with the degree of harm.  
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 This study of the Restatements will conclude in many ways where we began: with an 
assessment of the reception of the Restatements, but with a particular focus on what this means 
for recovery. Recovery is often front of mind for litigants and is, above all else, a statement by 
the courts on what the law considers sufficient for justice to have been served. The influence of 
the Restatements on conceptions of justice thus turns on a key question: whether we should 
accept a Restatement that emphatically does more than state what the law is, but also—at 
times—takes the liberty to adopt a minority viewpoint and state what the law should be. 
Ultimately, though it offers clarity in certain provisions of the law and may advance a policy 
position, the Restatement has become a policy necessity in clarifying the law for the judicial 
record. 
 It is this sense of the Restatement’ indispensability among certain circles of judicial 
policy makers that demonstrate its necessary role in legal development. In reality, while there are 
certainly flaws in the Restatement process, a solution exists in a greater focus in the drafting 
process in assessing the realities and impact of litigant recovery. In their abstract form, 
developed with input from the legal academy and jurists, their impact is often left unaddressed. 
As a policy instrument, the Restatements would benefit from prior review and a considered 
reflection on what happens when they supplant existing state law. While each of these scenarios 
will invariably be presented as conflicting and different, the Restatements applications in 
Connecticut and Washington, as we shall consider, demonstrate a need to more acutely assess 
how the Restatements are applied in practice. This thesis will conclude with some suggestions 
for reform, particularly in light of balancing the Restatements’ value as a tool of uniformity with 
the need to preserve and leave to the states themselves the ability to develop and advance the 
common law on issues of policy and recovery.   
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Chapter I. Restatements of the Law, the American Legal Institute, and 
Critics and Supporters of the Aspirational Restatement  
 
 Restatements of the Law, a series of treatises on the common law in the American 
judicial system, have long served as the principal achievement and product of the American Law 
Institute (ALI), a research association of academics and jurists who began with the intent of 
simplifying and distilling principles of the United States common law. The ALI’s work—and its 
application in state courts—has been met with persuasive acceptance, especially by some liberal 
jurists in recent years, but also with condemnation from some conservative jurists who critique 
its alleged aspirational objectives and construction as a judicial treatise that lacks the input of the 
elected legislature.1 
 Black’s has defined the Restatement as a treatise that focuses on “describing the law in a 
given area and guiding its development.”2 The Restatements distinctive format—of “black-letter 
rules, official comments, illustrations, and reporter’s notes”—are frequently cited in judicial 
cases and used to adjust and supplement the common law systems found in United States 
jurisdictions.3 Important to bear in mind, however, are the limitations of a Restatements 
influence: in legal argument and judicial decisions, it is merely persuasive (often utilized by 
litigants to fill gaps in a state’s common law tradition) and its rules and comments are not 
binding on a Court unless it has been adopted within the jurisdiction by the highest court of an 
 
1 This critique, however, has its limits and the delineation of particular camps of judicial philosophy on the issue is 
offered here with some trepidation. For instance, the late Associate Justice Antonin Scalia assailed the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment as “of questionable value” and suggested that the ALI had “abandoned 
the mission of describing the law and have chosen instead to set forth their aspirations for what the law ought to be.” 
Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 475, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1064, 191 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2015). However, Scalia’s opinions 
within the same term and the term prior cited with approval earlier versions of the Restatements seven times across 
five cases. Director’s Letter from Richard L. Revesz, American Law Institute (Winter 2016) (on file with the 
American Law Institute Archives).   
2 Restatement, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
3 Id.  
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individual state.4 Still, it is the individual state courts that hold the singular power to rely on or 
accept Restatement principles in their decisions and enforce those principles on litigants.5 Since 
their inception in 1923, there have been three versions of Restatements compiled at various 
periods, though not all categories of the law have seen subsequent revisions: the Restatements 
(First) refers to works completed between 1923-1944, the Restatements (Second) are those 
between 1952 and 1986, and the Restatements (Third) are those from 1987 to the present.6 
 A Restatement entry or “chapter” is encyclopedic and also practical in its format. Those 
Restatement entries typically appear as follows, first stating the principle itself (distilled from the 
common law tradition in various U.S. jurisdictions) followed by commentary on interpretation 
and application developed by the ALI. An illustration (described in abstract, algebraic terms) and 
a Reporter’s Note of citations may also be appended. The example below, from the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, concerns the ALI’s analysis of a particular aspect of the common law 
Statute of Frauds:7  
§ 111 Contract of Executor or Administrator: 
 
A contract of an executor or administrator to answer personally for a duty of his decedent  
is within the Statute of Frauds if a similar contract to answer for the duty of a living 




a. Analogy to suretyship. The first clause of § 4 of the English Statute of Frauds is treated 
as a special application of the suretyship provision of the second clause. Where the 
principal obligor dies before the promise in question is made, the case may not fall 
 
4 Black’s, supra note 2.   
5 The decisions and adoption of specific Restatement principles in courts in the U.S. states of Connecticut and 
Washington will be examined in Chapter II and Chapter III, respectively.  
6 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/story-line/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2020); For instance, this 
thesis concerns the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, released in 1981, and the Restatement (Second) and (Third) 
of Torts. The Restatement (Third) considers language from the 1960s and updates on product liability provisions 
that were circulated in the early 2000s.  
7 Statute of Frauds: “A statute (based on the English Statute of Frauds) designed to prevent fraud and perjury by 
requiring certain contracts to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged.” Statute of Frauds, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
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precisely within the usual definition of suretyship. See Restatement of Security § 82. But 
the situation is similar, and similar rules are applied. If there was no obligation before the 
death of the decedent, the promise is not within this clause. Where the executor or 
administrator makes a contract on behalf of the estate, the creditor's right against the 
estate ordinarily depends on the right of the executor or administrator to exoneration. 
Compare Restatement, Second, Trusts §§ 266-71A. 
 
b. Exceptions. The executor provision is subject to the same exceptions as the suretyship 
provision. See Topic 2, §§ 112- 23; Restatement of Security §§ 89-100. Thus 
the rule relating to novations stated in § 115 and the “main purpose” rule stated in § 
116 are similarly applied to promises of executors or administrators.8 
 
 Restatements address a wide array of practice areas: specifically, the ALI has released 
Restatements in the fields of Contracts, Torts, Employment Law, Property, Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment, Trusts, Judgments, inter alia.9 The development of the Restatements is an 
extensive process, undertaken over the course of a decade, if not longer, and the reports are 
regularly revised (hence, Restatements are issued and referred to by their editions as the 
“Restatement (Second) of Contracts” or the “Restatement (Third) of Torts”).  
Generally, the Restatement process entails reporters who are selected and tasked with 
working to “structure the project, prepare drafts, and present drafts.”10 These reporters are 
frequently drawn from the legal academy (most are professors), and are often not practitioners.11 
The reporters then receive feedback on their work from appointed advisers as part of the ALI’s 
Council, as well as volunteer ALI members—which include practitioners—who serve as part of 
the Members Consultative Group (MCG).12 The Restatement itself goes through four formations 
prior to issuance: a preliminary draft (a substantial segment of the project completed) is 
circulated, followed by a Council draft (a working draft circulated to participants), a tentative 
 
8 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 111 (Am. Law. Inst. 1981).  
9 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, https://www.ali.org/publications/#publication-type-restatements (last visited Nov. 23, 
2020).  
10 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/how-institute-works/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).  
11 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, https://thealiadviser.org/inside-the-ali-posts/the-restatements-first-second-third/ (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2020).  
12 Id.   
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draft (that incorporates revisions received from the Council), and a discussion draft (which may 
include comments and feedback from ALI members at their annual meeting). A proposed final 
draft may be released if there exist extensive changes, and then the official text is released by the 
Institute and becomes the model text cited by courts, legislatures, and the academy, superseding 
previous versions.13 Importantly, however, because the Restatements do not by themselves carry 
the force of law and lack the force of statutes, which can be replaced by successive amendments 
from the legislature, a court must adopt the new provisions or changes to Restatements each time 
they are issued in order for any portion to be binding on litigants. In this sense, the adoption of 
Restatements in courts is something of a patchwork, where an outdated Restatement of Contracts 
may still govern even if the ALI has formally announced a change in the language.   
 Together, the Restatement is the ALI’s primary project that helps it aspire to its mission: 
to alleviate the “uncertainty” and “complexity” in the American legal system, which “cause 
useless litigation, often make it difficult to advise persons of their rights, and create delay and 
expense after litigation begins.”14 In definition, the Restatement’s objective was understood as 
one that acts to limit and explain: in an early release of the plan establishing the ALI, William 
Draper Lewis—the Institute’s inaugural director—argued that the “Restatement should express 
the principle which those responsible for its production regard as sound, and that, furthermore, 
where the present law though certain is not well adapted to promote the ends generally regarded 
as desirable.”15 Still, the ALI’s founders envisioned practical limitations of the work: while the 
Restatement retained the latitude to express and suggest a change in the law, they must have care 
taken “to avoid proposing changes of a political or social character which would promote 
 
13 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 10.  
14 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/faq/, (last visited Nov. 24, 2020). 
15 William Draper Lewis, Plan to Establish the American Law Institute, 9 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 77, 77-79 (1923).  
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controversy.”16 This historical development and balancing of aspirations became a central aspect 
that governed the development and release of the ALI’s Restatements.   
Classical and Progressive Legal Thought: American Law at the Century’s Turn and  
The ALI’s Quest for Judicial Clarity 
 
Lewis, a former dean at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, began his 
directorship of the American Law Institute shortly after its incorporation in 1923. Lewis, 
together with other notable early twentieth century jurists and lawyers such as Elihu Root,17 
George W. Wickersham,18 former President and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court William 
Howard Taft, Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Learned Hand,19 and then-Associate Judge 
of the New York Court of Appeals Benjamin Cardozo,20 convened the ALI with both practical 
and aspirational aims in mind. As Root suggested in an early report, the objective of the Institute 
in pursuing the Restatements was “to help make certain much that is now uncertain and to 
simplify unnecessary complexities, but also to promote those changes which will tend better to 
adapt the laws to the needs of life.”21 
 That original mission concerned achieving some measure of conformity across America’s 
judicial system, especially at the federal level where interventions into state actions were 
becoming increasingly prevalent. The development of an increasingly significant federal forum, 
where rights and pleading practice became beset with rules and the minutiae of civil procedure, 
 
16 Lewis, supra note 15, at 77.  
17 Root was Secretary of War under President William McKinley and was also Secretary of State under President 
Theodore Roosevelt.  
18 Wickersham, the first President of the ALI, was Attorney General under President William Howard Taft and later 
oversaw the Council on Foreign Relations.  
19 Hand was especially revered and recognized as laying the foundation for much of modern torts jurisprudence from 
his seat on the Second Circuit and is also known for his antitrust decisions in the Southern District. By some 
estimations, Hand is the most cited lower-court judge in opinions by the Supreme Court. GREAT AMERICAN JUDGES: 
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 471 (John R. Vile, ed., 2nd ed., 2003).  
20 Cardozo would later be elevated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court by Herbert Hoover, though he is 
perhaps best remembered for his decisions on the New York Court of Appeals and his influence on the American 
common law tradition.  
21 Elihu Root, Report Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute, 1 ALI Proc. 14 (1923).  
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reflected a broader social trend as America and its courts become more connected. As Lawrence 
Friedman has suggested, the development of technology and new means of communication 
meant that the nation now “spoke, as it were, a common language; and shared a common 
culture.”22 Friedman applies this social theory to the legal world, suggesting that this 
development, in part, contributes to the legal expansion in power of the federal bench and also 
the need in the 1920s—at the time the ALI was constituted—to form a uniform judicial system 
as a bulwark that could protect the rights and interests of litigants and permit them to petition for 
relief within the federal system.  
 Such an expansion required as a predicate that effective, organized judiciary in order to 
restrain and shepherd this unprecedented advance. The outcome and direction of the federal 
judiciary of the early twentieth century relied on charting the contentious path between two 
camps of legal thought: the so-called “Classical Legal Thought” of the nineteenth century and 
the “Progressive Legal Thought” of the early twentieth which would come to prevail. The latter’s 
elevation, particularly under the Warren Court in post-war America, was in part led by the ALI’s 
efforts at modernizing for the sake of judicial economy. The former’s downfall may have been 
the result of shifting conceptions of judicial and philosophical morality. Morton Horwitz has 
suggested that the Classical model—particularly in the common law—fell victim to “struggles 
over the meaning of social justice and challenges to the moral foundations of individualism that 
had emerged by the turn of the century.”23 Horwitz recognizes that it was precisely this 
newfound judicial antipathy toward the “traditional legitimating ideal of equality of opportunity 
as practiced within a market system that was thought to distribute rewards more or less fairly 
 
22 LAWRENCE MEIR FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 5 (1st ed., Yale Univ. Press, 2004).  
23 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 4 (1st ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 
1992).  
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according to the value of one’s economic contribution”24 that heralded the change in justice. In 
short, the new judicial system had a new focus: equality, at least in the classical sense,25 of 
access to relief at the federal bench.  
 G. Edward White, in his multi-volume work on the presence of law in the shaping of 
American history, recognizes that the Supreme Court—and federal judiciary—had largely come 
to view themselves as acting in the capacity of “guardian review,” where the primary 
responsibilities of the federal courts entailed recognizing access to procedural safeguards and 
protections while preserving the integrity of the court system. White notes that the court of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries found itself adopting new notions of due process 
and applying these principles to questions of police power and civil liberties.26 So, too, were 
areas of contract and industry swept up in the same due process implications, especially with 
respect to workers’ rights.27 In this sense, White identifies judges as applying new law and 
expanding latitude while concurrently presenting themselves as guardians, as “enforcing the 
foundational principles on which the Constitution rested.”28 
The nexus, as it were, of progressive jurisprudence, state influence, and corporate 
regulation within the “guardian review” era was the Supreme Court’s address of questions of 
labor law in the landmark Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner represented a 
departure from that final vestige, to many critics of the time, of a lassiez-faire judicial attitude 
 
24 HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 4-7.  
25 It seems unlikely that the ALI and its fellow progenitors of “Progressive Legal Thought” considered equality in 
the racialized and gendered senses we envision today. Rather, it was a question of “equality of access” in the 
economic sense (or, occasionally, the religious), with a direct repudiation to the 19th century notion of the 
dispensable industrial worker, suited to his occupation and restricted in judicial relief as a result of his fixed social 
station.  
26 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY, VOLUME 2: FROM RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH THE 1920s 
354-356, (1st ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2016).  
27 Id. at 355.  
28 Id.   
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and, many feared, would herald a new activism that would corrupt and expand federal influence. 
Paul Kens has gone further, suggesting that “[t]he most vehement among them [the Lochner 
critics] viewed the decision as a coup d’état. They charged that the Court had usurped power that 
properly rested with the legislature, and ultimately in the people, in order to turn a controversial 
political philosophy into fundamental law of the land. Thus, Lochner became the ultimate 
symbol of judicial overreaching.”29 These fears of Lochner were not borne out in the long term30 
and, as Ellen Frankel Paul has argued, were largely exaggerated. The Court did not, as New 
Dealers would come to argue, overturn “hundreds of laws regulating economic relations” under 
the aegis of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protections.31 Rather, the Court 
and the federal bench seemed to acknowledge—Lochner notwithstanding—that the pace of 
judicial progress necessitated some government intervention and also a clear, consistent 
application of common law principles of equity to the conditions of the working class. White, 
too, recognizes Lochner’s infamy in a different sense: as a catalyst for the type of uniformity and 
clarity that the ALI would strive for in the Restatement’s construction and development. 
Lochner, for White, was not merely inconsistent with the Court’s jurisprudence in our historical 
review: rather, it was a debate over the selective and minute interpretations of terminology. The 
Court was concerned with defining whether the purpose of judicial intervention was “to 
determine whether that intervention was an undue one, constituting an invasion of protected 
rights, or a due one, a permissible exercise of governmental powers (emphasis in original).”32 
Lochner is thus both a judicial anomaly and a catalyst for the ALI’s early objectives.  
 
29 Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Tradition or Change in Constitutional Law?, 1 NYU J.L. & Liberty 404 (2005).  
30 The end of the Lochner era is largely recognized as concluding with the passage of the landmark West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state minimum wage, 
rejecting and effectively stymieing the “freedom of contract” Locherian ideal.  
31 Ellen Frankel Paul, Freedom of Contract and the Political Economy of Lochner v. New York, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
Liberty 515 (2005).  
32 White, supra note 26, at 403. 
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 It was in this legal world beset by both a clinging, rigid traditionalism and an 
unprecedented pace of economic development that the ALI set about with its Restatement work. 
The first set of Restatements—which would take from 1923-1944 to realize—covered a wide 
corpus of the law: Agency, Business Associations, Conflict of Laws, Contracts, Judgments, 
Property, Restitution, Sales of Land, Security, Torts, and Trusts.33 This early focus, Judge 
Cardozo recognized, would come to redefine how the law is applied and how the law is taught. 
He argued that the Restatement “will be invested with unique authority, not to command, but to 
persuade. It will embody a composite thought and speak a composite voice. Universities and 
bench and bar will have had a part in its creation. I have great faith in the power of such a 
restatement to unify our law.”34 Cardozo’s faith in the vision outlined by Lewis and the other 
founding ALI members would be borne out in perhaps two of its most cited and adopted 
treatises, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Restatement (Second) and (Third) of 
Torts. These publications, covering an area of the law subject to great change as the century 
progressed, would contribute to the conversation and scholarship that came to surround major 
judicial policy and the outcome of contract and tort actions nationwide.    
The ALI’s Early Restatements: Critics and Supporters of the Restatements and  
the Ideal of the Restatements as Policy Instruments 
 
 The release of the early Restatements (nine were completed by 1947, the Restatement of 
Contracts was the first to be released in 1932) was met with support and ambivalence by a 
burgeoning legal academy. Charles Clark,35 writing in the Yale Law Journal shortly after the 
 
33 Jordan Steele, Leslie O’Neill, Emily Johns, First Restatement of the Law Records Finding Aid, Univ. of Penn. 
Biddle Law Libr. (2008), 
http://dla.library.upenn.edu/dla/pacscl/ead.pdf?id=PACSCL_UPENN_BIDDLE_USPULPULALI04001.  
34 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 9, (2nd ed., Yale Univ. Press, 2009).  
35 Clark was Dean of Yale Law School, President of the Association of American Law Schools, and worked with the 
ALI as an adviser on property and the later Restatement of Property.  
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release of the original Restatement of the Law of Contracts, suggested that the ALI was 
“outstandingly important in its ambitious objective, in its personnel and in the resources which it 
has secured for research in law.”36 Still, Clark expressed early concerns both in the practicality of 
the ALI’s methodology and with the possibility of in fact achieving  simplification: while 
“simplification as a clarification and orderly statement of intellectual processes and conclusions 
is desirable,” Clark contends that the notion that the “resulting statement is the law nowhere and 
in its unreality only deludes and misleads.”37 For Clark, the other concern with the Restatement 
of Contracts—one which remains perennial—was the ideal of “securing of authority…to back up 
statements.”38 The fact that the Restatement is in essence “a statute without statutory enactment” 
makes the Restatements’ attempt to reform procedure nearly impossible. Clark seems ambivalent 
about abandoning the project entirely, though remained pessimistic that they will influence and 
achieve the conformity that the Institute seeks: with “no sovereign power behind them to compel 
the courts to breathe meaning into them,” if the courts determine they lack meaning, the “courts 
should turn to something else and are doing so.”39 Still, the Restatement sparked academic 
discourse around the distillation of time-honored and well-regarded legal theorems. Clark 
identifies that Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts,40 dealing with the legal concept of 
consideration,” seems to be “deserving of praise for [its] forward-looking point of view” but also 
subject to ire for its “vagueness covering the inevitable compromise.”41 In this sense, Clark’s 
incisive criticism reveals another early critique of the Restatements: the effort to distill 
 
36 Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L. J. 643, 644 (1933).  
37 Id. at 654.  
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
40 Section 90 reads, in pertinent part, as follows: “A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only be enforcement of the promise.” Restatement of 
Contracts § 90 (Am. Law. Inst. 1932).  
41 Clark, supra note 36, at 656-657.  
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principles, especially those that were customary, ran a perilous line of increasing efficiency for 
the sake of judicial economy at the expense of compromise. If the Restatements’ black letter 
principles were adopted and adhered to without limitation, Clark feared, litigants and their 
interests could suffer an inflexible judiciary that would rather apply direct statutory principle 
rather than seek resolution. 
Clark’s former concern around force and the notion that the Restatements would hold 
minimal influence in judicial proceedings appears in the absence of statutory force appears to 
have been proven false. The Restatements gained increasing traction in the early years of the 
Warren Court, where a progressive federal judiciary looked to the Restatements applications as 
an opportunity to find support for aspirational policy objectives. Herbert Wechsler42—revisiting 
the topic of the Restatements—addressed their role in policymaking in a review during the late 
1960s. Wechsler found that the Restatements and the nation as a whole had recognized the 
increasing value of the legislature and the need for legislative adoption of model codes, but still 
held that the Restatements had value in advancing a particular legal philosophy. Indeed, 
Wechsler argued that “what our law requires most and will increasingly require in the future is 
that systematic reexamination and re-thinking at the legislative level that is not within the 
competence of courts.”43  
Wechsler wrote specifically on a particular decision by the ALI Council relative to § 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.44 That section was originally limited to regulating a 
 
42 Wechsler was a distinguished professor at Columbia Law School, where he focused primarily on Constitutional 
law, and has written an influential and oft-cited treatise on federal practice (The Federal Courts and the Federal 
System) with Henry M. Hart, Jr. Wechsler also served as the Director of the ALI and was critical in the development 
of the Model Penal Code. Tamar Lewin, Herbert Wechsler, Legal Giant, Is Dead At 90, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 2000, 
at C21.  
43 Herbert Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the Restatement Work of the American 
Law Institute, 13 St. Louis U. L.J. 185, 187 (1968).  
44 This particular section, which drew ire from some courts and practitioners, affirmed “the strict liability of the 
vendor of ‘any product that is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or his 
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particular industry (cosmetics) in a preliminary draft but came to be widely applied to any 
product marketed in a retail setting. In this sense, § 402A made all vendors liable for defective 
products and, thus, exposed numerous industries to the implications of potential legal and 
financial liability for faulty products were the courts to adopt § 402A. It is precisely in this policy 
area, Wechsler noted, that the ALI’s aspirational objective in § 402A was realized. The “action 
of the highest courts upon the issue in the intervening years”45 affirmed that the aspirational was 
in fact practical. Still, the adoption of this provision demonstrated a central issue that barred the 
ALI from achieving its objective of uniformity: it had, perhaps, expanded beyond the bounds of 
its traditional limitation and fallen victim to engaging in a policy discussion.  
Wechsler, for his part, proffers a solution to the issue. The ALI engaging in the 
advancement of a particular legal philosophy comports with its mission, he argues, citing to 
William Lewis’ admonition that the Restatements should express “as nearly as may be the rules 
which our courts will today apply.”46 Importantly, Wechsler adds in response to critics of the 
Restatements, the courts themselves are empowered to adopt individual provisions of their own 
accord. The common law “calls on the courts to show a due regard for precedent but also calls on 
them to choose between conflicting lines of doctrine.”47 Wechsler is thus forward-thinking, 
petitioning for an optimism and the belief that the ALI should “liberate the process of 
 
property’ for ‘physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,’ if ‘the seller is 
engaged in the business of selling such a product’ and ‘it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.’” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Am. Law. Inst. 
1965).  
45 For instance, California’s Supreme Court adopted Section 402A in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 22. 
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), and the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on Section 402A in 
apportioning strict liability for an asbestos producer, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 209, 447 
A.2d 539, 546 (1982)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously adopted the “unreasonable danger” 
standard in Section 402A in Azzarello v. Black Brothers Company, 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978), though this 
decision was overturned and the scope of 402A significantly limited in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 628 Pa. 296, 
104 A.3d 328 (2014).  
46 Herbert Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the Restatement Work of the American 
Law Institute, 13 St. Louis U. L.J. 185 (1968). 189.  
47 Id. at 189-191.  
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restatement from any surviving rigid limitations.”48 Further, Wechsler identifies his position that 
the Restatements should not only be liberated, but should explicitly identify “where the law that 
it has stated is in need of renovation.”49 It was in this period, particularly during the waning years 
of the Warren Court in the late 1960s, that the ALI began to focus on identifying and promoting 
areas of the law that required review and revision. In short, the ALI entered a period of 
increasingly aspirational Restatements.  
Restatements Today: Contemporary Criticism and Outlooks on Judicial Adoption In State 
Courts and Restatement Treatment At The Federal Level 
 
In more contemporary reviews, Restatements—especially those of contracts—have 
become mired in controversy over questions of philosophy: are they really the most economical 
means to condense the law and see their results realized? Doug Rendleman, writing on the 
Restatement’s approach to restitution policy50 in contracts cases, stresses that the Restatement 
and its laborious editing process often results in a description of the law that fails to represent the 
most recent developments of the common law. The Restatements, for Rendleman, look “to 
reprise a method of legal scholarship that has been out of fashion for nearly one hundred 
years,”51 yet requires careful navigation as restitution at its heart requires a Restatement that 
“articulates and publicizes these unjust enrichment principles and makes the law of restitution 
available and more accessible to the legal profession.”52 Despite these concerns, Rendleman’s 
consideration of restitution, specifically, evinces a need for the clarity that a Restatement can 
 
48 Wechsler, supra note 46, at 192.  
49 Id.  
50 Restitution: “A body of substantive law in which liability is based not on tort or contract but on the defendant's 
unjust enrichment. See UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 2. The set of remedies associated with that body of law, in which 
the measure of recovery is usu. based not on the plaintiff's loss, but on the defendant's gain. 
Cf. COMPENSATION; DAMAGES.” Restitution, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
51 Doug Rendleman, Restating Restitution: The Restatement Process and Its Critics, 65 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 934-
944 (2008).  
52 Id. at 943.  
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offer: as it is an “essential and nuanced common law area” and “many smaller American states 
lack a decision on particular restitution points,” the Restatement can serve its purpose of 
clarifying and resolving areas of legal ambiguity.53 Still, it is precisely because restitution is 
undeveloped that the Restatement holds value. More developed and divergent areas of the law—
such as contracts and torts—often differ from state to state and have developed practice areas.  
That there is value to a Restatement seems apparent, too, in convoluted areas such as the 
conflict of laws.54 As Kermit Roosevelt and Bethan Jones note in a Yale Law Journal forum, the 
Restatement (First) had “bad rules…[which were] self-contained and derived from a territorialist 
[sic] premise.” Moreover, these rules, they write, were often “insensitive to the content of state 
laws”55 and neglected to consider the value and import of decisions by an individual judge at the 
state level. Still, Roosevelt and Jones believe that many of these problems have been resolved in 
subsequent iterations of Restatements. Importantly, the sense of territorialism that existed 
initially became difficult to sustain, they argue, and forced the Restatements—especially in the 
realm of conflicts—to focus on identifying when the law and “practice converges sufficiently to 
allow the formulation of appropriately narrow and policy-sensitive rules.”56 Thus, the 
Restatements seem to have particular application and value in clarifying the law in areas with 
significant overlap and ambiguity. They can act, as in conflicts, as a vehicle for judicial economy 
in supporting the clarification of complex legal concepts.  
However, contracts and torts do not reflect this lack of clarity. While many of their rules 
are common across jurisdictions, the corpus of law in contracts and torts—especially on the 
 
53 Rendleman, supra note 50, at 936.  
54 Conflict of Laws: “A difference between the laws of different states or countries in a case in which a transaction 
or occurrence central to the case has a connection to two or more jurisdictions. — Often shortened 
to conflict. Cf. “CHOICE OF LAW.” Conflict of Laws, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
55 Kermit Roosevelt III and Bethan Jones, The Draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws: A Response to 
Brilmayer & Listwa, 128 YALE L. J. 293-314 (2018).   
56 Id. at 302.  
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question of commercial transactions in contracts—differs markedly between states. Gregory 
Maggs has recently characterized the ALI’s ambitions in contracts as electing to “state the best 
rules, not necessarily the rules that most courts have followed.”57 In this sense, the Restatement 
of Contracts has been particularly aspirational in its application and has often resulted in tension 
with longstanding, affirmed principles of state law. This, Maggs argues, reveals the resulting 
hazards of relying on the Restatements to guide judicial reasoning: it is difficult to “critically 
think about the legal system” if judges, as well as practitioners, remain uncertain when the 
Restatement (Second) “reflects actual contract law and when it merely states a proposal that has 
not yet gone into practice.”58 Maggs, here, argues for accountability by the ALI in identifying 
explicitly when their writings are a codification of existing common law principles and when 
their principles reflect an objective or goal of the Institute itself. The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, too, has been beset with criticism over matters of interpretation. Writing in the 
Columbia Law Review, Robert Braucher has suggested that the Second Restatement gets at the 
central question of intention and attempts to codify this section. The Second Restatement 
includes this emphasis “on the context in which a contract is made and on the meanings attached 
by the parties to their words and conduct.”59 For Braucher, the Restatement’s focus on 
interpretation is worthwhile, but there remains some trepidation around when the Restatement 
should move its interpretations and definitive statements of the law from the “comment” section 
to the “black letter” statement itself.60  
 
57 Gregory Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern Development of Contract 
Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 508, 510 (1998).  
58 Id. at 511.  
59 Robert Braucher, Interpretation and Legal Effect in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 13, 
14 (1981).  
60 Id. 
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Despite this criticism and concern around interpretation and intent, the Restatements and 
the ALI have remained stalwart and respected institutions within the legal community, 
particularly in the last several decades. The last twenty years have also demonstrated a policy 
shift toward achieving uniformity of statutes and codes in many jurisdictions in certain practice 
areas, especially trusts and torts.61 Michael Traynor has identified and lauded the Restatement as 
the solution to the modern “complex and challenging panorama of statutory as well as common 
law” and noted the Restatement’s value in navigating the “sophisticated concepts of post-Erie 
federalism.62 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)—which negated federal courts 
rights to create general common law in diversity cases—eroded, in many respects, the uniformity 
of a federal common law that the Restatement had first sought to introduce. For Traynor, the 
development of the Restatements have proven their efficacy in aiding judicial proceedings, 
though Traynor urges the ALI to consider expanding the scope of its coverage areas: in his view, 
the ALI should aim to “explore other areas that might either evoke, given the present day 
challenges and circumstances, or go well beyond the vision of the founders.”63 Accordingly, 
Traynor argues for a more expansive vision of the Restatements development and value in 
expanding the scope of the recorded common law tradition.  
Minimal scholarly attention, however, has been afforded to the adoption of the 
Restatement at the state level, a jurisdictional policy phenomenon that has become apparent in 
state court decisions over the last twenty years. In a 2011 white paper to state jurists, Victor 
Schwartz and Cary Silverman warned of the Restatements’ deleterious impacts in tort law and 
 
61 These efforts are reflected in publications that have been promulgated as policy solutions, such as the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), and the Uniform Apportionment of Tort Responsibility 
Act (UATRA).  
62 Michael Traynor, The First Restatements and the Vision of the American Law Institute, Then and Now, 32 S. Ill. 
U. L.J. 145, 146 (2007).  
63 Id. at 165.  
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cautioned of a threat to litigants’ rights at the state level, bemoaning the “chaos in the law” for 
commerce and industry prompted by the Restatement’s embrace of concepts of strict product 
liability. Schwartz and Silverman argue that the Restatements greatest concern at the state level 
is judges who embrace their doctrines “without reasoning about where and when strict liability 
should apply.”64 Silverman, too, has noted that the ambiguity of the tort Restatement’s § 402A, 
dealing with non-manufacturer liability, has created a situation where state courts that have 
adopted the Restatements have “no clear position” on major aspects of modern liability 
practice.65 While not writing in direct response to Wechsler’s position on § 402A, the concerns 
of Schwartz and Silverman come from the perspective of counselors within the commerce 
industry who view—to an extent, rightfully so—§ 402A as acting to limit consumer choice and 
restricting the ability of industry producers to retail products.66 
Symeon Symeonides, meanwhile, reexamines the issue of state adoption by considering 
the first Restatement of Conflicts of 1934 and the interests of its reporter, University of Chicago 
Law Professor Joseph H. Beale.67 Symeonides attacks the notion that the Conflicts Restatement 
is “the punching bag of any Conflicts class” while expressing concern that Beale is “a target of 
ridicule” as a reporter. In construction and application, Symeonides also examines Beale’s 
critics, who express concern over the limitations of the Restatements generally. Importantly, the 
question of state application arises in Symeonides’ discussion of the Conflicts Restatement itself: 
for many critics, he argues, the Restatement “retarded the development of American conflicts 
law by placing it into the straightjacket of rigid, mechanical rules.”68 
 
64 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ & CARY SILVERMAN, THE NEW RESTATEMENT: BLUNTING 4 (U.S. Chamber Institute for 
Legal Reform, 2011).  
65 Id. at 11.  
66 Id. at 12; For a more exhaustive study of the Restatement of Torts (Second) and § 402A, see: George W. Conk, Is 
There A Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 Yale L. J. 1087 (2000).  
67 Symeon C. Symeonides, The First Conflicts Restatements Through The Eyes of Old, 32 S. Ill. U. L. J. 31 (2010).  
68 Id. at 40, 41.  
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State outlooks on the Restatements are difficult to discern, though we can look to the 
federal circuit to get a sense of how they should be received. In Beau Townshend Ford Lincoln, 
Inc. v. Don Hinds Ford, Inc., 759 F. App’x 348 (6th Cir. 2018), the 6th Circuit placed the spirit of 
the Restatement in directing state and federal decisions thusly: we “may look to an applicable 
Restatement for guidance ‘when there is no controlling state law on point when the state has 
indicated…that it considers the Restatements to be persuasive authority.”69 Indeed, the decision 
to adopt Restatements in toto or in part at the state level is often apparent when Restatement 
principles can act to fill gaps in state legal policy. For instance, in a recent Arizona trust case, 
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Pac. Fin. Ass’n, Inc., 241 Ariz. 406 (2017), the court 
relied on the Restatement to reach a determination that a valid trust existed. That state level 
decision, distinct from the federal practice, resulted in a new, controlling understanding of what 
constitutes a trust across Arizona courts.70 In another case, Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. E.I. 
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 118 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Tex. App. 2003), the Texas Court of Appeals—
drawing on a state Supreme Court decision—recognized §§ 261-264 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts as establishing impracticability as a defense to contract performance in 
Texas.71 These cases may appear, admittedly, anecdotal. However, our study herein, which 
addresses the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in Connecticut and the Restatement (Second) 
and (Third) of Torts in Washington, affirm this anecdotal principle that the Restatements do 
exert significant policy-making authority even at the state level. As is readily apparent in the 
 
69 Beau Townsend Ford Lincoln, Inc. v. Don Hinds Ford, Inc., 759 F. App’x 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Garrison v. Jervis B. Webb Co., 583 F.2d 258, 262 n.6 (6th Cir. 1978)).  
70 Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Pac. Fin. Ass’n, Inc., 241 Ariz. 406, 414, 388 P.3d 556, 564 (Ct. App. 
2017).  
71 Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 118 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Tex. App.), opinion 
supplemented on overruling of reh’g, 118 S.W.3d 929 (Tex. App. 2003).  
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Texas case, litigants’ rights and outcomes can be significantly impacted by Restatement 
adoption, as a wholesale adoption of a contract defense was recognized at the state level.  
William Richman and David Riley, in a study of the Restatement of Conflicts in 1997, 
identify eleven states who rely on the Restatement as their “predominant choice-of-law 
methodology,” with as many as 29 explicitly adopting and citing certain provisions of the 
Restatements as a matter of course.72 In this sense, Richman and Riley suggest—numerically—
that the Restatements and their provisions offer something to state judiciaries eager to clarify the 
scope of their own common law tradition or substitute Restatement policy for legislative 
enactments. Numerical references of adoption offer compelling questions of the scope of 
Restatement authority by indicating, in many respects, how often a particular point of law is 
addressed. The reason for their popularity and reception is simple, especially in those 
undeveloped areas of the law at the state level. Anita Bernstein, writing on the question of 
product liability in the Restatements, notes simply that their popularity stems from their ability to 
streamline entire areas of the law. They make research easier. Their division of content 
into black letter and comments saves time for the harried lawyer who must read quickly. 
Their neglect of a topic may well be salutary. Restatement, in short, yields practical, 
doctrinal, and epistemological benefits.73 
 
Connecticut and Washington, meanwhile, have adopted particular provisions of the 
Restatement of Contracts (Second) and the Restatement of Torts (Second) and (Third), 
respectively, that address gaps in their own prior state common law jurisprudence. These 
Restatement provisions also act, at times, to extend and restrict litigants’ opportunities to argue 
and raise defenses in the course of their cases. For example, in Connecticut—examined in greater 
detail infra in Chapter II—the state Supreme Court has recognized the impracticability doctrine 
 
72 William M. Richman and David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary 
of Its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196, 1200 (1997).  
73 Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1677 (1995).  
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as a valid defense, citing affirmatively to the Restatement (Second) in O'Hara v. State of 
Connecticut, 218 Conn. 628 (1991), thereby adjusting the availability of contract defenses to 
litigants.74 Conversely, Connecticut has affirmatively declined to adopt the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts and its guidance, noting that it is not binding if in conflict with state precedent. Snell v. 
Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc., 158 A.3d 787, 805 (Conn. Ct. App. 2017). Washington, meanwhile, 
looked favorably to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, adopting and citing its 
principles, especially around the question of “unreasonably dangerous products” and stressed 
that the focus in evaluating a claim is “upon the product, rather than upon the conduct of the 
supplier of the product.” Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 92 Wash. 2d 118, 120, 594 P.2d 911, 913 
(1979). Thus, Washington demonstrated its adoption of § 402A, despite the concerns and claims 
raised by those in commerce practice over the danger of the strict product liability doctrines in 
practice. In both Connecticut and Washington, it is evident that their state courts turn, at times, to 
the Restatement for direction in their rulings.  
Together, these cases and others considered in Chapters II and III illumine the role and 
place of the Restatements in the construction of state common law jurisprudence. With the 
adoption of a Restatement and its specific provisions, especially in developed realms of the law, 
state courts have the power to alter existing common law jurisprudence and to, in effect, make 
policy. What remains outstanding is how cases, from the commencement of an action, are 
influenced by Restatement principles and what impact these policies and judicial philosophies 
have on future actions. Reviewing the role and impact of those judicial decisions reveals just 





74 O'Hara v. State of Connecticut, 218 Conn. 628, 637, 590 A.2d 948, 953 (1991).  
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Chapter II. Case Study—Applications of the Restatement of Contracts 
(Second) In Connecticut At The Appellate and Supreme Court Level  
 
 The courts of the State of Connecticut has adopted several provisions of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, which will form the focus of this portion of the study. In Connecticut, the 
Restatement’s provisions serve two critical functions: they act to supplement existing common 
law principles of contract drafting, defense, and enforcement in Connecticut and, second, they 
act to supplant precedent and replace with the Restatement’s provisions. These two functions 
have varying impacts: they serve to protect foundational elements of contractual interpretation 
while also acting to limit the extent of litigants’ rights and, in some cases, they can act to 
constrain opportunities for legal argument under Connecticut theories.  
 With respect to the first function—of supplementing existing common law principles—
the Connecticut Supreme Court has issued a myriad of opinions that seek to affirm basic tenets 
of contracts under the common law. In those cases, the Court has often turned to the Restatement 
to authoritatively and concisely outline a legal principle. For instance, in Hopkins v. Titan Value 
Equities Group, Inc., the Supreme Court explicitly adopted the Restatement’s provisions around 
one of the most foundational elements of contract formation: the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. In Hopkins, the Court relied on the Restatement’s interpretation to outline the limits and 
application of this covenant, contending that it is “axiomatic that the implied duty of good faith 
and fair dealing is a covenant implied into a contract or a contractual relationship.”75 The Court 
explicitly adopted the Restatement provision—that “[e]very contract imposes upon each party a 
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement”76—in reaching its 
 
75 Hoskins v. Titan Value Equities Grp., Inc., 252 Conn. 789, 793, 749 A.2d 1144, 1146 (2000).  
76 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 205 (1979).  
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determination that “the existence of a contract between the parties is a necessary antecedent to 
any claim of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.”77  
 Thus, in operation here, the Restatement of Contracts in Connecticut is used not to 
supplant or subvert a common law principle but to supplement it. The reference to § 205 is 
applied by the Court in an affirmative sense, seeking to find support for the covenant’s existence 
within Connecticut’s common law tradition while also acknowledging that it is an accepted tenet 
of contract formation within the legal community. The Court is careful to note that the 
Restatement alone does not inform the decision, noting that the covenant is made in “accordance 
with these authorities” (emphasis added), not merely the singular authority of the Restatement 
but the Restatement together with the full corpus of Connecticut’s common law of contracts.  
The Supreme Court again turned to the Restatement with a similar affirming purpose in 
determining that party must adhere to the plain terms of a contract and satisfy contractual 
promises, even if doing so might impose undue financial hardship. In Gibson v. Capano, the 
Court adopted the Restatement’s §§ 154 and 159 in determining that “in private disputes, a court 
must enforce the contract as drafted by the parties and may not relieve a contracting party from 
anticipated or actual difficulties undertaken pursuant to the contract, unless the contract is 
voidable on grounds such as mistake, fraud or unconscionability.”78 The Restatement, again, 
merely acts here to supplement Connecticut’s existing common law precedent codified in Holly 
Hill Holdings v. Lowman, where the Supreme Court recognized that the freedom to contract 
includes the “right to contract for the assumption of known or unknown hazards and risks that 
may arise as a consequence of the execution of the contract.”79 In Holly Hill Holdings, the Court 
 
77 See note 75, supra, at 793. 
78 Gibson v. Capano, 241 Conn. 725, 730–31, 699 A.2d 68, 71 (1997).  
79 Holly Hill Holdings v. Lowman, 226 Conn. 748, 755–56, 628 A.2d 1298, 1302 (1993).  
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recognized this high bar when analyzing that a purchaser’s assertion of a property’s “as-is” 
condition failed to provide grounds for voiding a contract. It would be several years later that the 
Court recognized the Restatement as a corollary to this inquiry in Gibson. In both cases, the 
principle is the same—but in Gibson, the Court found support in the pithy language of the 
Restatement and made the inquiry more precise. The adoption of §§ 154 and 159 demonstrate the 
Court’s receptiveness to engaging with Restatement principles that act to state what the law is 
and make a declaration of extant principles clear to lower courts within the jurisdiction.  
Between this measure of complete adoption in Hoskins and Gibson and the substantive 
reform of the common law, the Court has also elected to apply portions of the Restatements in an 
effort to clarify its methods of legal inquiry. In Shah v. Cover-It, Inc., the Appellate Court 
declined to adopt the Restatement’s black letter definition of a contract breach and its attendant 
obligations, instead relying on the Supreme Court’s approach of a multifactor test to determine 
the existence of a breach. In its analysis, the Court first maintained Connecticut’s common law 
tradition, averring that it is a “general rule of contract law that a total breach of the contract by 
one party relieves the injured party of any further duty to perform further obligations under 
the contract.”80 The Court—relying on its decision in Rokalor, Inc. v. Connecticut Eating 
Enterprises, Inc., 18 Conn.App. 384, 391, 558 A.2d 265 (1989)—held in an examination of an 
employment dispute that a material breach bars continued duty by the non-breaching party 
without relying on a Restatement interpretation.81 
However, when it came to the more focused question of determining whether or not a 
breach had in fact occurred, the Court did elect to apply the multifactor test outlined in the 
 
80 Shah v. Cover-It, Inc., 86 Conn. App. 71, 75, 859 A.2d 959, 963 (2004) (emphasis added).  
81 See also: State v. Lex Associates, 248 Conn. 612, 624, 730 A.2d 38 (1999); 669 Atlantic Street Associates v. 
Atlantic–Rockland Stamford Associates, 43 Conn.App. 113, 125–26, 682 A.2d 572, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 949, 
950, 686 A.2d 126 (1996).  
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Restatement (Second) of Contract’s § 241. Citing the Connecticut Supreme Court’s endorsement 
of the multifactor Restatement test in Bernstein v. Nemeyer,82 the Appellate Court specifically 
quoted and adopted the Restatement’s test in full:  
In determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is material, the 
following circumstances are significant: (a) the extent to which the injured party will be 
deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected; (b) the extent to which the injured 
party can be adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be 
deprived; (c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will 
suffer forfeiture; (d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform 
will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable 
assurances; [and] (e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to 
offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.83 
 
Thus, while the common law continues to govern the obligations of parties in the event  
that one party breaches a contract, the Restatement has come to supplant the dictates of the 
common law inquiry and sees as a substitute its own multifactor test in court determinations of 
the existence of material breaches. The Restatement therefore functions in Bernstein as a 
modifier, adding to the existing law and focusing the legal arguments that must be presented 
when seeking to prove the existence and operation of material breaches of contract terms. The 
Appellate Court thus sought out a balance here between the Restatement and the extent of its 
influence: rather than adopting the provision en masse or replacing the common law in its 
entirety, the Court adopted its relevant portions for a limited purpose.  
 Conversely, in an earlier case, West Haven Sound Development Corp. v. West Haven,84 
the Court turned to the question of practicability of a contract’s terms and had found the 
Restatement’s guidance compelling in a focused and particular application. In West Haven Sound 
Development Corp., the Court dealt with whether the plaintiff could bring a cause of action for 
 
82 Bernstein v. Nemeyer, 213 Conn. 665, 672, 570 A.2d 164 (1990).  
83 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981).  
84 W. Haven Sound Dev. Corp. v. W. Haven, 201 Conn. 305, 514 A.2d 734 (1986).  
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breach of contract85 and whether a referendum and order of the trial court constituted an “event” 
which rendered satisfaction of the contract otherwise impossible.86 The Court cited affirmatively 
to the Restatement’s §§ 261-272, finding agreement with the basic tenet that the “[W]here, after 
a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the 
occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which 
the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or 
the circumstances indicate the contrary.”87 While conceding that a governmental order—such as 
a referendum—would constitute “an event” under § 264, a second part of the inquiry—viz., the 
determination of the breaching event and the extent of a party’s control over a breaching event—
was novel and utilized, again, the Restatement’s guidance to afford clarity in the absence of 
direction from the common law.  
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the Restatement’s analysis required a consideration 
of who was at fault: though the confounding action—the referendum—was brought by the 
citizens of West Haven, the Court held that the citizenry and its administration were inseparable 
and that the referendum “can only be viewed as the action of the city of West Haven, the same 
entity which, through its elected and appointed representatives, had entered into the contract with 
the plaintiff.”88 Applying the Restatement’s guidance, the Court found that the question turned 
whether West Haven and its administrators could be viewed as separate. Thus, under the 
 
85 See also: West Haven v. Impact, 174 Conn. 160, 384 A.2d 353 (1978) and New Haven Savings Bank v. West 
Haven Sound Development, 190 Conn. 60, 459 A.2d 999 (1983). 
86 The facts of the case—which had been in litigation for about a decade by the time of the instant decision—are in 
essence that the Plaintiff, West Haven Sound Development Corp., contracted with the City of West Haven in the 
Savin Rock area to develop a restaurant. The contract indicated that a substantial part of the adjoining land would be 
developed by West Haven and other developers for “commercial, recreational and apartment use.” Ultimately, a 
referendum and subsequent court order resulted in the adjoining property being converted to a public park and the 
restaurant closed and later brought an action for breach of contract against the City.  
87 Id. at 313; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 264 (1981).  
88 See note 84, supra, at 315.  
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Restatement’s analysis, West Haven failed to meet the burden of proving that they were “without 
fault” because they had expressly allowed the referendum to proceed and the two groups—
citizens and administrators—were one in the same. Here, the Restatement resulted in an adverse 
municipal outcome and also raises important questions. Did the Restatement, because of its 
broad and general objective of clarifying the law, fail to take into account the unique bargaining 
position, functions and, nature of a municipality that present it with a different set of possible 
factors that can interfere with the performance of a contract?89 The Appellate Court, perhaps 
sensing some of the particular and acute circumstances facing municipalities in contract actions, 
appended a specificity requirement and analyzed under the same Restatement framework in a 
subsequent case—Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim90—which dealt with a similar 
agreement between a developer that relied on future promises of investment in a particular area.   
 In certain applications of contract law, the Restatement is at odds with existing 
Connecticut jurisprudence. The Court has shown a willingness to discriminate and apply those 
provisions it feels are especially relevant or clarifying. For example, during the early years of the 
Restatement’s existence, the Court showed antipathy toward adopting its dictates when they 
conflicted with established jurisprudence. In Colonial Disc. Co. v. Avon Motors,91 the Court 
considered the proper role of intentionality in interpreting the terms of a contract. Drawing on the 
Court’s common law precedent in Byram Lumber & Supply Co. v. Page,92 the Court found that 
in making an intent inquiry in third party actions, “all of the circumstances surrounding the 
 
89 Maine has dealt with a case on similar terms and developed the question of a municipality’s liability for its own 
frustrating actions. Elsemore v. Hancock, 137 Me. 243, 18 A.2d 692 (1941).  
90 Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 131 Conn. App. 99, 30 A.3d 703 (2011). Here, the Plaintiff—
Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC—was unable to recover under the more specific damages requirement and under 
an analysis of the scope of the Defendant’s control over the frustrating action.  
91 Colonial Disc. Co. v. Avon Motors, 137 Conn. 196, 200–01, 75 A.2d 507, 509–10 (Conn. 1950).  
92 Byram Lumber & Supply Co. v. Page, 109 Conn. 256, 146 A. 293 (Conn. 1929).  
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making of the contract must be taken into consideration.”93 In defining the law of the 
jurisdiction, the Court found that the “ultimate test to be applied is whether the intent of the 
parties to the contract was that the promisor should assume a direct obligation to the third party 
and that that intent is to be determined from the terms of the contract read in the light of the 
circumstances attending its making, including the motives and purposes of the parties.”94  
 The Restatement principle on the same subject, however, is at odds with the Court’s 
judicial principle: in the Restatement, the “final test is whether the third party is a donee or a 
creditor beneficiary.” The final test in Connecticut seeks merely to answer whether or not the 
“promisor should assume a direct obligation to the third party”95—and does not require the Court 
to look to whether or not the third party is a donee or a creditor. The Court in Colonial Disc. Co. 
elected not to follow the Restatement and stressed that there were practical limitations on 
determining the status of a third-party contractual party that made the Restatement’s principle 
impossible to enforce and difficult to discern. Thus, in this context, the Court recognized that the 
Restatement’s ideals were limited by practical constraints and rejected them. This interplay of 
determining when the Restatement serves a practical purpose is critical to judicial access, but 
also represents one of the key perils in Restatement applications at the state level: if the provision 
is impractical, then why include it in the first place?96   
 
93 See note 91, supra, at 200.  
94 Id. at 200; The Court ultimately recognized that “[T]he law in this jurisdiction is, therefore, that the ultimate test 
to be applied is whether the intent of the parties to the contract was that the promisor should assume a direct 
obligation to the third party and that that intent is to be determined from the terms of the contract read in the light of 
the circumstances attending its making, including the motives and purposes of the parties.”  
95 Id. at 202.  
96 The ALI can, of course, address issues of application and the unpopularity of particular provisions in the context 
of subsequent Restatements. The desire for clarification and additional guidance, for instance, has long been 
demanded over the contentious addition of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which governs strict liability 
for sellers. For a further discussion of the conflicts over § 402A in the context of Washington courts, see Chapter III, 
infra, at 50 to 55.   
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 In certain cases—specifically those that constrain litigants’ rights and opportunities for 
legal argument—the Restatement can adjust the availability of legal remedies and affect the 
scope of recovery. In Weiss v. Smulders,97 the Court found that in addition to the multifactor 
materiality test adopted by the Court in Bernstein, an inquiry into the scope of materiality 
extends further under the Restatement: “[T]he reasonableness of the injured party's conduct in 
communicating his grievances and in seeking satisfaction is a factor to be considered in this 
connection.”98 In this context, then, the subjective factor of “reasonableness” is introduced to the 
Court’s analysis. Importantly, that “reasonableness” assessment was not a component of the 
Restatement’s black letter principle. Instead, it was drawn from the comment section—added by 
the Reporter, a member of the academic and legal community—and reviewed separately by the 
panel of judges and practitioners that often review black letter Restatement language as part of 
the ALI’s process.99 The Reporter’s comments in the Restatement process permit more 
independence and allow for the Reporter’s opinion to be expressed in the final text of the 
Restatement. Thus, academic influence becomes manifest in legal ideas at the state level, as 
exhibited in the adoption of the “reasonableness” standard in the Weiss decision.    
 The Restatement’s impact on contract cases also extends to opportunities for recovery of 
damages, especially in the realm of the type of damages afforded and the availability of contract 
remedies such as specific performance.100 In Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp.,101 the Appellate Court 
 
97 Weiss v. Smulders, 313 Conn. 227, 96 A.3d 1175 (2014). 
98 Id. at 264; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 242, Comment (b) (1981).  
99 See Chapter I, supra, at 3-4 for a discussion of the Restatement’s Reporter and the involvement of various 
constituencies and members of the legal community in the Restatement drafting process.  
100 Specific Performance: “The rendering, as nearly as practicable, of a promised performance through a judgment or 
decree; specif., a court-ordered remedy that requires precise fulfillment of a legal or contractual obligation when 
monetary damages are inappropriate or inadequate, as when the sale of real estate or a rare article is involved. 
Specific Performance, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).   
101Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 64 Conn. App. 218, 779 A.2d 847 (2001), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 266 Conn. 544, 
833 A.2d 891 (2003). See also: Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Associates, Inc., 38 Md.App. 144, 154 & n. 3, 380 
A.2d 618 (1977). 
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recognized that recovery by the plaintiff—a hospital patient—could only be offered if he 
qualified as a “lost volume seller”102 under the common law standard set forth in Connecticut 
under McMahon v. Bryant Electric Co.103 In its decision, the Appellate Court focused its 
analysis, contending that the Superior Court failed to conduct an analysis of whether the “lost 
volume” doctrine applied under the Restatement’s definition. Indeed, the Court concluded that 
the “measure of damages in such [“lost volume”] cases is the lost volume of business that the 
nonbreaching seller in a contract for the sale of goods or services incurs because of the buyer’s 
breach, undiminished by the profits from the sale of similar goods or services during the term of 
the breached contract.”104 The Restatement and a confluence of common law precedent is thus 
applied again in the context of determining the circumstances and the standing required to bring 
a claim. Here, then, the Court again relied on a comment from the Restatement in order to make 
the case that the “lost volume” rule cannot apply to the litigant at bar. Citing to the Restatement § 
347, the Court found that “lost volume” status can only apply if the injured party meets the 
following prerequisite:  
If the injured party could and would have entered into the subsequent contract, even if the 
[original] contract had not been broken, and could have had the benefit of both, he can be 
said to have ‘lost volume’ and the subsequent transaction is not a substitute for the 
broken contract.105 
 
 The adoption of this provision sets two crucial restrictions on litigants’ opportunities to 
bring legal action in Connecticut and argue under theories of contract recovery: first, the 
Restatement now determines the methods of analysis by which the Court determines if a party 
 
102 Lost Volume Seller: “A seller of goods who, after a buyer has breached a sales contract, resells the goods to a 
different buyer who would have bought identical goods from the seller’s inventory even if the original buyer had not 
breached. Such a seller is entitled to lost profits, rather than contract price less market price, as damages from the 
original buyer’s breach.” Lost Volume Seller, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
103 McMahon v. Bryant Electric Co., 121 Conn. 397, 185 A. 181 (1936).  
104 See note 101, supra, at 223-24.  
105 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347, Comment (f) (1981).  
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qualifies to have “lost volume.” That analysis requires the Court to determine whether or not the 
party had the capacity to enter into an additional contract—a factual inquiry—and also sets a bar 
that a litigant must overcome in order to present themselves as a “lost volume” seller. Second, 
the Court—in adopting the advice of the Restatement’s comment—also limits litigant 
opportunities to quash an action via a preliminary motion. The comment the Court adopts in full 
indicates that it is a “question of fact whether the injured party would have chosen to enter the 
second transaction if there had been no breach of the first contract.”106 In effect, this adoption 
suggests that a cause of action relying on an underlying “lost volume” claim could survive or 
entirely avoid a dispositive motion—such as a motion for summary judgment107—because such 
motions rely on the notion that there are no “material facts” in order to permit judicial relief.108 
 Further, in Gianetti, the Appellate Court concluded that the Restatement should apply, 
acting to extinguish the common law standard of McMahon that was previously applied in 
determining a litigants’ “lost volume” status: “the doctrine of mitigation of damages is not 
applied in such cases, and the measure of damages is the amount the plaintiff would have earned 
from the performance of the breached contract were it not for the breach, less any costs 
attributable to its performance.”109 In the absence of the doctrine of mitigation of damages, the 
Court thus privileged a Restatement principle and effectively amended the possible outcomes 
available to litigants. This additional standard, in “lost volume” contract actions, reflects directly 
 
106 See note 105, supra, at § 347.  
107 Summary Judgment: “A judgment granted on a claim or defense about which there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and on which the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. The court considers the contents of 
the pleadings, the motions, and additional evidence adduced by the parties to determine whether there is a genuine 
issue of material fact rather than one of law.” Summary Judgment, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
108 Judicial relief, in this case, constituting a dismissal of the action or a portion of the action that fails for want of a 
factual dispute.  
109 See note 101, supra, at 228.  
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how the Restatement acts to adjust judicial outcomes and recovery opportunities in Connecticut 
litigation and suggests that its impacts can be keenly felt at various points in litigation.  
 In other areas of contract recovery, the Supreme Court has found that the plaintiff is 
barred from recovery for contract actions on issues of pain and suffering by applying the 
Restatement’s provisions. In Gazo v. City of Stamford,110 the Court concluded that the Plaintiff 
was not entitled to recovery under contract theories based on the Restatement’s evaluation. In a 
dispute over medical services afforded under a municipal insurance contract, the Plaintiff sought 
recovery of certain intangible damages such as pain and suffering, which the Restatement 
(Second) of Contract’s § 347 (b) expressly bars.111 § 347(b) acknowledges the impracticality of 
determining intangible recovery, especially on issues of emotional distress: “Where the injured 
party's expected advantage consists largely or exclusively of the realization of profit, it may be 
possible to express this loss in value in terms of money with some assurance. In other situations, 
however, this is not possible and compensation for lost value may be precluded by the limitation 
of certainty.”112 The Restatement thus takes the practical approach by recognizing that inquiries 
into the extent of emotional damage are inherently fraught with issues of objectivity.  
The Court noted that the record did not reflect attempts by the Plaintiff to “seek the 
contract price paid by Chase Bank for the work done by Pierni [the Defendant] or any lost 
profits. Instead, the plaintiff seeks recovery [solely] for his physical and mental pain and 
suffering, lost wages and medical bills resulting from Pierni’s negligence.”113 Despite the fact 
 
110 Gazo v. City of Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 765 A.2d 505 (2001).  
111 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 (b) (1981). § 347 reads, in pertinent part, as follows: “Subject to the 
limitations stated in §§ 350- 53, the injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest as 
measured by: (a) the loss in the value to him of the other party's performance caused by its failure or deficiency, 
plus; (b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less; (c) any cost or other 
loss that he has avoided by not having to perform.”  
112 Id.   
113 See note 110, supra, at 265-266. 
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that the Plaintiff “cast this claim in contractual language,” he “in essence he seeks a tort 
recovery,” the Court held. The Court recognized that this could not be countenanced as the 
Restatement “ordinarily do[es] not encompass such losses as pain and suffering.”114 The Gazo 
decision, as in analogous cases that consider the role of the Restatement and theories of recovery, 
also runs contrary to existing Connecticut common law. In Tolland Enterprises v. Scan-Code, 
Inc., the Court recognized the opposite: that a contract breach can provide for recovery of 
consequential damages, including those concerned with the emotional category such as pain and 
suffering.115 Gazo offers two points for reflection: first, it acts to bar competing or dual recovery 
theories of contract (thus, a litigant cannot not bring a pain and suffering cause of action twice 
and attempt to recover in the context of both a contract claim and a tort claim). Further, in going 
against the Court’s prior decision in Tolland Enterprises and adopting the Restatement’s bar to 
recovery under contract actions, the Court constrains how litigants can plead their case and 
requires that a cause of action sound in tort. Second, the Gazo Court turned again to the 
Restatement to outline how the Court views recovery generally: by asserting that recovery for 
emotional damages fails to manifest in contract cases, the Court has adopted the Restatement’s 
broader approach to the policy question of what and when damages are appropriate. In other 
words, the Restatement sets the tenor of the appropriateness of damages under particular actions. 
This is as much a legal decision as a policy one: with Gazo, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that recovery for “pain and suffering” requires a tort claim and not a contract claim. They must 
be pled separately to prevail.  
 
114 See note 110, supra, at 265-266. 
115 Tolland Enterprises v. Scan–Code, Inc., 239 Conn. 326, 332, 684 A.2d 1150 (1996) (“a breach of the accord by 
the plaintiff entitled the defendant to specific performance of the accord and any consequential damages”).  
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The Court has also turned to the Restatement when weighing questions of contract 
validity in the mortgage context. Here, the Court considered both substantive common law in 
competing jurisdictions and the Restatement, uniting those sources to reach the determination 
that certain types of contract provisions must be excluded in Connecticut for as a result of 
compelling public policy interests. In Brown v. Soh,116 the Court—citing positively to the 
Restatement’s § 195—found that “exculpatory agreements117 in the employment context violate 
Connecticut public policy.”118 § 195 states that exculpatory agreements are void on grounds of 
public policy because they allow parties to escape the consequences prompted by intentional or 
negligent harm:  
 (1) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or 
recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public policy. 
(2) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused negligently is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if 
 
(a) the term exempts an employer from liability to an employee for injury in the 
course of his employment; 
 
(b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public service from liability to 
one to whom that duty is owed for compensation for breach of that duty, or 
 
(c) the other party is similarly a member of a class protected against the class to 
which the first party belongs. 
 
(3) A term exempting a seller of a product from his special tort liability for physical harm 
to a user or consumer is unenforceable on grounds of public policy unless the term is 
fairly bargained for and is consistent with the policy underlying that liability.119 
 
The Court in Brown considered exculpatory contracts in the employment context,  
 
116 Brown v. Soh, 280 Conn. 494, 909 A.2d 43 (2006).  
117 Exculpatory Clause: “A contractual provision relieving a party from liability resulting from a negligent or 
wrongful act.” Exculpatory Clause, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Cf. Limitation of Liability Clause.  
118 See note 116, supra, at 503.  
119 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 (1981).  
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specifically, a provision in an employment contract with a racing car company that barred 
recovery of damages and limited liability prematurely for physical injury. In Brown, the 
Restatement’s application was used—similar to cases examined supra such as Shah—to 
supplement existing Connecticut precedent and narrow the focus of the Court’s inquiry. The 
Court previously ruled in Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp.120 that “[t]he ultimate 
determination of what constitutes the public interest must be made considering the totality of the 
circumstances of any given case against the backdrop of current societal expectations.”121 While 
that common law principle was preserved in Brown, the Restatement was used to clarify its 
application in the context of an employer-employee relationship, where the bargaining power 
between the parties is inherently different and the employer, presumably, holds the stronger 
bargaining position.  
 The decision in Brown relied on the Restatement’s § 147 to establish wholesale that 
exculpatory contracts that attempt to exclude intentional or negligent harm must be void as 
contrary to public policy in the employment context. To buttress this sweeping argument, which 
effectively acts to limit contract defenses and expands the potential scope of employer liability, 
the Court relied on common law principles from other jurisdictions which were in comity with § 
147.122 Brown, then, sees the Restatement play out in the context of Connecticut caselaw with 
striking clarity around a policy issue: what is equitable in an employment context? When do 
liability provisions become unwieldy and, in effect, unethical? The Restatement’s drafters thus 
see here their position of “what the law is” realized in the context of a particular field, such as 
 
120 Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 276 Conn. 314, 885 A.2d 734 (2005).  
121 See note 120, supra, at 330.  
122 See also: Bunia v. Knight Ridder, 544 N.W.2d 60,63 (Minn.App.1996) (newspaper's exculpatory agreement with 
newspaper carrier violated public policy given parties' disparity in bargaining power), review denied (Minn. May 9, 
1996), Pittsburgh, [Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway] Co. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 72, 115 N.E. 505 
(1916); Pugmire v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 33 Utah 27, 92 P. 762 (Utah 1907).  
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employment litigation. Brown, too, carries considerable precedential consequence for 
employment litigation and employment defense in Connecticut practice. Employers—cognizant 
of the Brown ruling—would have to construct their contracts accounting for the likelihood that 
broad, all-encompassing exculpatory clauses could be easily voidable on public interest grounds. 
Thus, contract terms in Connecticut reflect marked influence from the clarifying nature of the 
Restatement’s § 147 and the attendant limitations the Restatement imposes on exculpatory 
clauses in employment contracts.123 
 In Connecticut, however, the Restatement (Second) of Contract’s application seems most 
consequential in an assessment of how the Court moves from the proposed, abstract ALI 
Restatement rule to a practical application of these principles in Connecticut legal theory. In 
cases where the Restatement has wholly supplanted existing Connecticut common law, the 
inquiry must then turn to how litigant strategies become altered and what that means from a 
policy perspective. This is especially apparent in the nexus between the Restatement and the 
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA)124 on the question of mortgage obligations, 
which has marked impacts with respect to theories of contract recovery and also public policy 
interests that seek to make mortgage terms comprehensible and fair to consumers.  
 CUTPA has a corollary statute at the federal level—the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(FTCA)—and is modeled in many respects on the federal system outlined in the FTCA.125 In 
essence, CUTPA protects consumer interests at the state level in Connecticut by prohibiting 
“unfair competition and unfair and deceptive acts” in the context of business or consumer 
 
123 The legal principle established with the adoption of § 147 was applied in three recent cases: Kleen Energy Sys., 
LLC v. Comm'r of Energy & Envtl. Prot., 319 Conn. 367, 125 A.3d 905 (2015); Lavin v. Absolute Tank Removal, 
LLC, No. CV044003218, 2007 WL 448030, (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2007); and Lewis v. Habitat for Humanity of 
Greater New Haven, Inc., No. CV095030268S, 2012 WL 386391, (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2012).  
124 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110a et seq. (2011).  
125 Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) of 1914, 18 U.S.C. § 41-58 et seq.  
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relationships. Specifically, CUTPA provides a private right of action for those who suffer “a 
measurable loss of money or property as a result of an unfair or deceptive act.”126 The specific 
deceptive acts are not clearly defined by statute and the determination that an unfair or deceptive 
business practice occurred is a question—under the ambit of the courts—that is ascertained by 
conducting an evaluation under the Federal Trade Commission’s “cigarette rule,”127 which 
Connecticut adopted in Votto v. American Car Rental, Inc.128 
The Restatement came into play in evaluating a CUTPA action in the Appellate Court’s 
landmark ruling in Gebbie v. Cadle Co.129 In Gebbie, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
acted to bar the Defendant’s arguments on appeal that the contractual terms of a mortgage 
restructuring agreement were fraudulent or the result of a mistaken interpretation. Specifically, 
the Gebbie Court cited positively to the Restatement’s § 153,130 holding that the Defendant could 
not recover because a “party seeking to avoid a contract on the basis of a unilateral mistake must 
be the party that was mistaken.” The Defendant in the instant matter failed—under the 
Restatement’s standard—to prove that he was the mistaken party. Instead, his argument relied on 
the notion that it was the Plaintiff, not the Defendant, who was confused about the contract 
 
126 The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, CONN. DEPT. OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, 
https://portal.ct.gov/DCP (last visited Dec. 29, 2020). CUTPA allows for private citizens to act as their own 
“attorney general” and gain recovery—and judgment—in the interests of themselves and other consumers.  
127 The FTCA “cigarette rule” is as follows: “It is well settled that in determining whether a practice 
violates CUTPA we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the [F]ederal [T]rade [C]ommission for 
determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously 
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—in 
other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of 
unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury 
to consumers, [competitors or other businesspersons].... All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a 
finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because 
to a lesser extent it meets all three.” Naples v. Keystone Bldg. & Dev. Corp., 295 Conn. 214, 227–28, 990 A.2d 326, 
336–37 (2010) quoting Votto v. American Car Rental, Inc., 273 Conn. 478, 484, 871 A.2d 981 (2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
128 Votto v. American Car Rental, Inc., 273 Conn. 478, 971 A.2d 981 (2005).  
129 Gebbie v. Cadle Co., 49 Conn.App. 265, 714 A.2d 678 (1998).  
130 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 (1981).  
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terms. Thus, the Court found that the Defendant was making an argument that it lacked standing 
to bring: it sought to void the contract based on the alleged misinterpretation of the other party. 
The Court continued, observing that the Defendant also failed to make a viable fraud claim under 
the Restatement’s § 152 and 153: “[A]ccording to general principles of contract law, rescission 
based on a mistaken understanding of the terms of an agreement is available only where the 
mistake is mutual, or where one party's mistake has been caused by the other party’s fraud.”131 
The Defendant plainly failed to allege how fraud entered into the renegotiation of terms. In fact, 
the Court observed that the Defendant has admitted to an extent the validity of the contract, as 
the Defendant “openly acknowledges the existence of an agreement by which it is bound yet 
refuses to honor.”132 Under an evaluation of the Restatement, then, the Defendant’s legal 
argument have failed to  
In the context of CUTPA, the Court found that the Defendant was liable because he could 
not abrogate the contract’s validity by alleging a defense such as mistake or fraud that met the 
expectations of the Restatement. In affirming the CUTPA violation, the Court noted that the 
Defendant’s “actions forced the plaintiff to seek redress in the courts to have the agreement 
enforced. This is the type of behavior that CUTPA seeks to discourage.”133 In further outlining 
its affirmation of the CUTPA allegation, the Court observed that absent any ruling that the 
contract was void, the actions of the Defendant constituted precisely those that would be contrary 
to the dictates of public policy. The Appellate Court embraced Connecticut’s common law in 
 
131 See note 129, supra, at 276-77. The full text of the Restatement’s § 153 provides as follows: “Where a mistake of 
one party at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which he made the contract has a material 
effect on the agreed exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable by him if he does not 
bear the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154, and (a) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement 
of the contract would be unconscionable, or (b) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused 
the mistake.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 (1981).  
132 Id. at 279. 
133 Id. See also: Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn.Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170 (1979) and Bailey Employment System, 
Inc. v. Hahn, 545 F.Supp. 62 (D.Conn.1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 895 (2d Cir.1983).  
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reaching the public policy determination, citing to Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes134 
in concluding that “a practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the 
criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three.... Thus a violation of CUTPA may be 
established by showing either an actual deceptive practice ... or a practice amounting to a 
violation of public policy.... Furthermore, a party need not prove an intent to deceive to prevail 
under CUTPA.”135 A CUTPA violation was thus found by relying on the Restatement and, 
importantly, establishing a category of business practices within the mortgage industry that 
Connecticut courts consider to be contrary to public policy. The Gebbie ruling—using the 
Restatement as a base—allows for a whole class of mortgage actions and contract terms to 
become subject to the expectations of § 152 and 153. In other words, Gebbie utilized the 
Restatement with a degree of activism to accomplish a public policy initiative: mortgage 
agreements and renegotiations—if executed in accordance with the law—have a high value 
worth upholding to preserve the public trust in the mortgage system.  
Further, in Gebbie, the Restatement can thus be observed in practical application as 
something more than a mere abstract principle. Here, the Restatement worked to defeat the 
Defendant’s claims and rendered the Defendant liable for damages for a CUTPA violation that 
ran contrary to the Court’s beliefs on what constitutes sound public policy. The Restatement in 
the context of CUTPA has also seen a concerted effort from Connecticut practitioners 
themselves to move toward and adopt the Restatement’s values for the sake of clarity. In an 
evaluation of CUTPA’s application to particular areas of the law—such as cases for breach of 
contract—Connecticut Practice observed that certain sources of policy “would seem appropriate 
 
134 Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes, 223 Conn. 80, 105–06, 612 A.2d 1130 (1992). 
135 See note 129, supra, at 279.  
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in developing law under CUTPA,”136 especially given that the statute as amended fails to 
prescribe the particular definitions of “deceptive acts” and leaves that determination largely to 
the courts. Specifically, Practice presents as an example “a possible claim of unconscionability 
in a contractual relationship. How might a court consider when actions that might be 
characterized as being unconscionable are a violation of CUTPA? A determination that there is 
unconscionability in a contractual relationship is a basis for providing relief under the Uniform 
Commercial Code and also is applicable to contractual relationships not covered by the UCC 
provision, according to the Restatement Second, Contracts.”137 The Restatement, then, receives 
some support for its suggestions in the context of Connecticut attorneys as well as the bench. 
Practice—as a measure of the outlook of Connecticut practitioners—reveals areas of the law that 
could stand to benefit from the Restatement’s clarity. Here, in the CUTPA context, the 
Restatement can provide some clarity to an otherwise ambiguous area of the law and can serve to 
contribute to the resolution of critical legal questions in Connecticut.  
Together, these Connecticut cases suggest that the application of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts is varied in the state. In many instances, the Court turns toward the 
Restatement to affirm foundational tenets of contract law. In others, the Court adopts the 
Restatement principle and develops a novel legal principle in Connecticut practice. What is 
critical in both substantive changes and the Restatement’s affirmative guidance is that the 
Restatement guides the inquiry and is often given the same value as the common law. In this 
sense, present adoption of the Restatement in Connecticut seems to run contrary to what Yale 
Law Dean Charles Clark observed in his early review of the Restatement’s adoption nationwide. 
 
136 Robert M. Langer, John T. Morgan, and David L. Belt, 12 Conn. Prac. § 2.5, Policy in Construing Act, Unfair 
Trade Practices (2020).  
137 See note 136, supra, at § 2.5.  
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Writing shortly after the Restatement of Contracts was first released in 1932, Clark notes that the 
“restatements are furnishing the impeccable judicial citation (emphasis added) with which to 
garnish an opinion and that they are not affecting the course of decision in any material way, nor 
in a way comparable to texts and articles of law professors.”138 Connecticut cases reflect a 
different vision: while they may lend some credence to the Restatement for the purpose of 
“judicial citation” à la Clark,  judges at the Supreme and Appellate level seem to indicate a 
willingness to engage with the Restatement as a serious intellectual text that offers plausible and 
well-researched interpretations and guidance for courts to adopt. The Restatement in 
Connecticut, then, seems widely accepted and, in general, a valuable tool in outlining the law.  
 Connecticut cases, however, seem to fall in line with a vision of the Restatement that is 
broad and encompassing and approaches its inclusion from a myriad of perspectives. Indeed, as 
ALI Director Richard Revesz has noted, the Restatement can serve many purposes: it often 
“distills a rule that is latent in a body of case law, but which never has been expressly announced 
by a court.”139 In others, it can act to offer “new terminology to describe what courts are doing” 
and, in certain instances, anticipate “issues that have not yet arisen in decided cases and offer a 
view on how the law should be extended to decide those issues.”140 All of these various 
outcomes seem manifest in Connecticut jurisprudence and all embrace the same requirement, 
that there be some degree of judgment.  
While the scope of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts influence is apparent, its 
outcomes are not: the decisions examined suggest several possible outcomes that alter the extent 
of recovery and have a real impact on litigants and judicial outcomes. In striking cases such as 
 
138 See note 36, supra, at 661.  
139 Richard L. Revesz, The Debate Over the Role of Restatements, 41 THE ALI REPORTER 1, 1-4 (2019).  
140 Id. at 4.  
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Gebbie and Brown, the fate of an appeal or the very construction of contracts and their 
provisions in Connecticut are governed by the Restatement’s positions. These outcomes have a 
discernible impact on recovery and on rights and, in this sense, the Restatement plays a crucial 
role as a secondary source and as a bellwether when the common law cannot, or fails to, meet the 






































Chapter III. Case Study—Applications of the Restatement (Second) and 
(Third) of Torts In Washington At The Court of Appeals and Supreme 
Court Level 
 
In the State of Washington, the second case study considered here, there is a different set 
of relationships at play. Whereas Connecticut caselaw on the Restatements often concerns 
contracts in the context of business—and attendant financial harm to business operations—
Washington’s adoption of certain provisions of the Restatement (Second) and (Third) of Torts 
directly addresses the impact on litigant rights and, particularly, avenues toward the recovery of 
damages that the Restatement can dictate. Indeed, relative to legal duties and liability 
specifically, the Washington Supreme Court has embraced and balanced common law duties 
with the Restatement (Second) of Tort’s broader and all-encompassing approach that—in 
general—recognizes a right of recovery for the injured, but also recognizes the scope of issues 
presented by tort liability against manufacturers and their operations.141 
In Robb v. City of Seattle, the Court considered the apportioning of third-party liability 
against several police officers in an action where the officers negligently left a firearm at the 
scene of a crime during a Terry stop142 and the weapons were subsequently retrieved and used to 
effectuate a murder.143 In Robb, the Court found that the scope of the action did not fall under the 
auspices of the Restatement (Second) of Tort’s § 302B after conducting a thorough examination 
of the Restatement principle and the common law doctrines in Washington which both supported 
and rejected Restatement doctrine. § 302B, in pertinent part as follows, indicates that “[a]n act or 
 
141 For a discussion of the Restatement (Second) and (Third) of Torts and their outlook toward litigants specifically 
between the author and ALI Director Richard Revesz, see Chapter IV, infra, at ___ to ___. 
142 Terry Stop (cf. stop-and-frisk): “A police officer’s brief detention, questioning, and search of a person for a 
concealed weapon when the officer reasonably suspects that the person has committed or is about to commit a 
crime.” Terry Stop, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). See also: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 
(1968).  
143 Robb v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 2d 427, 433–35, 295 P.3d 212, 216–17 (2013).  
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an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is 
intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal.”144 In considering the 
applicability of § 302B’s definition of “realize” to determine the extent of a party’s potential 
liability, the Court began first with an analysis of the general common law rule, which holds that 
“in the absence of a special relationship between the parties, there is no duty to control the 
conduct of a third person so as to prevent him from causing harm to another’” (emphasis 
added).145  
Further, in this context, the Court determined that § 302B cannot be considered 
independently or exclusively of the underlying relationship required for duty to attach. Indeed, 
the Court in Robb identified two types of common law relationships that might serve as premises 
to liability: a “special relationship with the victim” or “a special relationship with the 
criminal.”146 Here, however, there existed neither: the novel question before the Court was thus 
whether § 302B could abrogate the common law reliance on a “special relationship”147 in the 
determination of third-party liability and instead find fault (and, consequently, award damages) 
on some other, independent basis such as “realization” that the Restatement favored.  
 
144 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B (1965). With respect to recovery, the Court has noted that § 302B alone 
does not prescribe the full panoply of possibilities or account for all limiting factors. For instance, “[w]here the 
intentional misconduct is that of the person who suffers the harm, his recovery ordinarily is barred by his own 
assumption of the risk (see Chapter 17A) or his contributory negligence (see Chapter 17). This does not mean, 
however, that the original actor is not negligent, but merely that the injured plaintiff is precluded from recovery by 
his own misconduct. There may still be situations in which, because of his immaturity or ignorance, the plaintiff is 
not subject to either defense; and in such cases the actor's negligence may subject him to liability.” Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 302B cmt. c (1965).  
145 Kim v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 143 Wash.2d 190, 195, 15 P.3d 1283 (2001) (quoting Richards v. 
Stanley, 43 Cal.2d 60, 65, 271 P.2d 23 (1954)). 
146 See note 2, supra, at 434.  
147 The Court also noted that certain third-party liability existed in other sorts of special relationships, such as 
“between a business and a business invitee, an innkeeper and a guest, state and a probationer, and a psychotherapist 
and a patient.” Id. at 434.  
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 The Court concluded that § 302B did not apply, though it did acknowledge that in other 
contexts, such as those seeking recovery under torts such as negligent infliction or intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, a duty could materialize outside of the context of special 
relationships. What is critical in Robb is also the identification by the Court of a distinct and 
discrete “common law of Restatements” in Washington jurisprudence when attempting to parse 
the existence of a duty of care and the extent of liability, especially for third-party defendants. In 
the development of tort actions, Washington elected to use and rely on past interpretations to 
shift in favor of the common law rule for special relationships, citing favorably to Hutchins v. 
1001 Fourth Ave. Assocs., 116 Wash.2d 217, 802 P.2d 1360 (1991) (finding no duty under the 
Restatement’s principles to a passerby assaulted while traversing the land of another) and Kim v. 
Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 143 Wash. 2d 190, 15 P.3d 1283 (2001), as amended (Jan. 31, 
2001) (finding no duty of care under the Restatement against a rental car company after a vehicle 
was stolen and used in a vehicular assault). In developing and relying on past Restatement 
interpretations—themselves a part of the common law—order to reject the applicability of an 
existing provision such as § 302B, Washington courts appear to attempt to approach the question 
of Restatement applicability holistically.  
However, the Court also acknowledged in Robb its own inherent inconsistency of 
apportioning duty. In its previous jurisprudence, viz. Parrilla v. King Cty.,148 the Court of 
Appeals found that liability attached to a bus driver who exited his bus while leaving it running 
with a visibly erratic man on board. In Parilla, the Court applied an analogous “foreseeability” 
standard to find liability which is almost parallel § 302B’s “realize” standard.149 However, while 
there existed no “special relationship” in Parrilla, the Court still applied and found liability 
 
148 Parrilla v. King Cty., 138 Wash. App. 427, 157 P.3d 879 (2007).  
149 Id. at 430.  
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under a separate, independent basis. In this sense, Robb is contradictory: the Washington Court 
rejected the Restatement’s attempt at making the question of duty uniform even when the 
existing common law jurisprudence remains inconsistent itself. To relieve itself of this potential 
contradiction, the Court concentrated on the existence of an “affirmative act”150 as central to the 
liability question: in Parilla, the leaving of the keys in the ignition was affirmative, in Robb, 
there was no such affirmative action.151 There is, perhaps, an antipathy toward adopting 
Restatement provisions in their entirety that contribute to this sense of judicial inconsistency. 
The Restatement is often helpful in explaining and considering the scope of liability in a 
particular case, but when its principles—because they are inherently aspirational—are 
inconsistent with the common law, the Court will often attempt to balance the two, perhaps in an 
effort to maintain its own independence.152 This balancing results in what appears initially to be 
an inconsistency in judicial reasoning.  
 However, while the determination and conformity of duty in Washington jurisprudence 
under the Restatement is less certain, its application to strict product liability within torts has 
been relatively consistent among decisions. The Restatement (Second) of Tort’s § 402A—which 
has long been considered a contentious provision153—became “approved as the law in this 
[Washington] jurisdiction with respect to defective products” in Little v. PPG Indus., Inc.154 
 
150 See note 147, supra, at 440-41.  
151 Though even this proposition seems dubious and a matter of parsing hairs: could it not be argued that the decision 
of the investigators to leave the firearms on the scene not an “affirmative act” similar to the bus driver’s decision to 
leave the keys in the ignition?  
152 The notion that Courts often seek to balance their independence against the principles of the Restatement is a 
frequent subject of scholarly debate. For a negative treatment of the Restatement’s impact and the dangers of 
American judicial positivism, see Alan Milner, Restatement: The Failure of a Legal Experiment, 20 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 795 (1958). For a positive view on the uniformity the Restatement can instill in judicial decision making vis-à-
vis torts, see Arthur L. Goodhart, Restatement of the Law of Torts, 83 PENN. L. REV. 4 (1935).  
153 For a full treatment of § 402A’s history and impact on the development of product liability, see Chapter I, supra, 
at 11-12, 17.  
154 Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979).  
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However, although the general contours of strict product liability in § 402A have been accepted, 
the Court still took issue with the Restatement’s Comment H and found that “this statement is 
open to question.”155 
 The black letter Restatement rule for § 402A reads as follows:  
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to 
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of 
his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller.156 
 
 Comment H defines the limitations of “defective condition,” which is the basis for 
imputing liability under the Restatement. If the product is not in a “defective condition,” liability 
cannot attach under § 402A. However, the Restatement adopted a broad understanding of 
“defective” and predicated such a determination on the presence of a “reason to anticipate” as a 
component of manufacturer’s liability. This doctrine has been subject to criticism, particularly 
with respect to the use of the word “defective” itself. Some have argued that the absence of a 
warning is better termed “unreasonably dangerous,” and that this ambiguity leads to the 
ineffective application and of § 402A in judicial decisions.157 The difficulty of applying the rule 
and its potential for judicial misuse becomes particularly acute in judicial attempts to interpret 
Comment H’s expectation of an “adequate warning” and the manifestation of a “reason to 
anticipate” among manufacturers. Indeed, Comment H, in pertinent part, clarifies the scope of 
 
155 See note 153, supra, at 120.  
156 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).  
157 John E. Montgomery & David Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for 
Defective Products, 27 S.C.L.Rev. 803, 819 et seq. (1976).  
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defection and provides model situations in which liability for defective condition could be 
introduced:  
[A] product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and 
consumption. If the injury results from abnormal handling, as where a bottled beverage is 
knocked against a radiator to remove the cap, or from abnormal preparation for use, as 
where too much salt is added to food, or from abnormal consumption, as where a child 
eats too much candy and is made ill, the seller is not liable. Where, however, he has 
reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular use, as where a drug is sold 
which is safe only in limited doses, he may be required to give adequate warning of the 
danger (see Comment j), and a product sold without such warning is in a defective 
condition.158 
  
 The Washington Supreme Court in Little was thus faced with the question of applying 
Comment H’s interpretation of “defective” against a manufacturer of cleaning solvent in the 
delivery of jury instructions. In Little, the plaintiff’s husband died as a result of using cleaning 
solvent that lacked certain warning labels and plaintiff brought suit for wrongful death under 
theories of strict liability and negligence. Central to the Court’s application and restricting of § 
402A was negligence and the lack of guidance on how to present negligence claims in jury 
instructions in a strict product liability action. In particular, the Court framed the issue of 
reasonableness around one of the sufficiency of the warning rather than the intent of the 
manufacturer, adding that while the Court agrees “with the defendant's contention that the rule of 
reasonableness has a role to play in products liability cases, it is a role which concerns itself with 
the sufficiency of the warning and the expectations of the user. The question is, was the warning 
sufficient to catch the attention of persons who could be expected to use the product; to apprise 
them of its dangers and to advise them of the measures to take to avoid those dangers?”159 While 
the plaintiff in Little sought additional damages under broad theories of negligence,160 the Court 
 
158 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. h (1965).  
159 See note 153, supra, at 122.  
160 The award of punitive damages (which may be more lucrative and significant than compensatory damages) for 
strict product liability, alone, is generally barred in Washington absent express legislative authorization. See Dailey 
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found that they could not comport with an application of strict liability and that the two must be 
treated as independent: “the objective of the rule of strict liability with respect to dangerous 
products is defeated if a plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant was negligent, or the 
latter is allowed to defend upon the ground that he was free of negligence. It is the adequacy of 
the warning which is given, or the necessity of such a warning, which must command the jury's 
attention, not the defendant's conduct.”161  
The Court reached this determination in Little for two reasons: first, it sought to limit the 
scope of recovery under § 402A because of the potential dangers for “limitless liability” and 
their attendant financial consequences against manufacturers posed by a subjective judicial 
determination of negligence. The Court sought to be cautious knowing that in the purchase and 
use of any product, specifically those with varying costs and degrees of quality, it “must be borne 
in mind that we are dealing with a relative, not an absolute concept.”162 In other words, the 
consumer of a product has differing expectations for quality and use depending on the nature of 
the product and its cost, and the manufacturer alone cannot bear the burden of ensuring that all 
products are in operable condition when cost is an inherent factor. Second, and critical to the 
influence of the Restatement on litigant rights, the Court found that § 402A—in establishing a 
uniform basis for apportioning strict products liability—already afforded litigants an adequate 
opportunity for recovery. If compensatory damages can be awarded with a § 402A finding of 
 
v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 129 Wash. 2d 572, 575, 919 P.2d 589, 590, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 718 
(1996). However, with the introduction of a theory of negligence, the potential for recovery of punitive damages 
could be made easier, particularly given the location of the manufacturer. Imprimis: “If the injury occurred outside 
of Washington, or if the manufacturer is located outside of Washington, and there appears to be a basis for an award 
of punitive damages, consideration should be given to whether the action should be filed in a jurisdiction that would 
permit the award of punitive damages. Alternatively, application of the Restatement rule regarding choice of law 
rule may favor the law of a jurisdiction that permits punitive damages.” § 26:5. Remedies—Punitive damages, 29 
Wash. Prac., Wash. Elements of an Action (2020-2021 ed.).  
161 See note 153, supra, at 120.  
162 Id. at 122.  
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strict liability, there was simply no need to expand the scope of recovery: the Court found that 
that award was sufficient to meet the standard of making the plaintiff whole. The sole question 
was, then, the nature of the question posed to a jury: whether a product is safe or “unsafe to an 
extent beyond that which would be reasonably contemplated by the ordinary consumer?”163  
The Court later addressed § 402A in other contexts, upholding the Little decision but 
recognizing certain exceptions. For instance, litigant rights to recovery were again restricted as 
Washington courts recognized that suppliers of component parts could not be held liable for 
other defective or unsafe components in the manufacture of a single product. In Simonetta v. 
Viad Corp.,164 the Court considered whether a manufacturer of an evaporator (a device which 
desalinizes sea water) was liable under § 388 and § 402A for insulation, produced by a different 
company, that included asbestos. Recognizing that the Restatement’s § 388 defines a supplier as 
“any person, who for any purpose or in any manner gives possession of a chattel for another's 
use…without disclosing his knowledge that the chattel is dangerous for the use for which it is 
supplied or for which it is permitted to be used.”165 In applying § 388 and holding that a 
component manufacturer is not liable under § 388 and § 402A, the Court again returned to the 
question of the scope of the “reason to anticipate” that accompanies a particular duty to warn in 
the manufacturing process. Indeed, citing to a prior Appeals Court decision in Sepulveda–
Esquivel v. Central Machine Works, Inc.166 (finding no liability under § 388 against a hook 
manufacturer when the hook itself did not contribute to the deficiency in a loading crane), the 
Court plainly determined that there must be a demonstration of actual knowledge of the 
manufacturer of a component before liability can attach under § 388. In this way, the Court 
 
163 See note 153, supra, at 122.  
164 Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 165 Wash. 2d 341, 197 P.3d 127 (2008).  
165 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 cmt. c (1965).  
166 Sepulveda–Esquivel v. Central Machine Works, Inc., 120 Wash.App. 12, 84 P.3d 895 (2004).  
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adopted a comparatively narrow approach to the apportioning of liability toward manufacturers, 
one which comports with case law in other jurisdictions which “similarly limits the duty to warn 
in negligence cases to those in the chain of distribution of the hazardous product.”167 In the 
process of advancing particular legal aims, the Court here found that the scope of recovery 
against manufacturers must be based on knowledge, in effect applying § 402A’s general rule of 
reasonableness requirement to a different subset of parties in a strict liability action. Here, then, 
the Restatement’s lack of clarity around who precisely holds a duty to warn played a role in the 
ruling of the Court that ultimately acts to limit the parties that a litigant can recover against.  
Escaping liability under § 388 as a component developer raises questions about the 
Restatement’s effectiveness and the Restatement’s construction: in excluding any discussion of 
precise liability determinations for the manufacturers and developers of a particular product, the 
ALI has effectively left it to the common law to discern when liability can attach to these 
component manufacturers. In this way, despite warnings against § 402A that often castigate it as 
applying beyond the scope of its authority, § 402A is also underdeveloped in ways that permit 
judicial imagination to define its limits. Consider, for instance, the denial of § 402A recoveries 
here for cases of component liability against, as Charles Cantu notes, the application of § 402A 
to cases that go beyond the sale of products and apply to “lease agreements” and the 
development of strict liability for leased products.168 In this respect, the common law and the 
Restatement again seem to work together in a tête-à-tête between the courts and the ALI around 
the scope of effective limits. Still, what is particularly notable about § 402A applications and 
adoptions at all is that they represent an area of the law with no basis in common law majority 
 
167 See note 163, supra, at 353.  
168 Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402a of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: A Mirror Crack’d, 25 Gonz. 
L. Rev. 205 (1990).  
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rulings prior to their inclusion in the Restatement. As Cantu argues, court rulings nationwide 
prior to 1965 had found that “the basis of liability in defective products cases had been either 
negligence, or express or implied warranty.”169 Only a scattered few “concurring and dissenting 
opinions called for the application of strict liability to manufacturers and/or sellers of defective 
products.”170 § 402A then can be perhaps best understood in the genre of the aspirational 
Restatement, as moving the law in a particular direction even absent a common law basis. That 
impact on recovery, particularly in Washington where the provision has been adopted, reflects 
the influence that Restatement ideology can have on the courts themselves. 
However, Washington has also turned more recently to the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
to guide its determinations in other areas at the nexus of multiple legal practice areas, specifically 
in determining liability for physical and emotional harms at the nexus of contract law and real 
property questions of land ownership. In Adamson v. Port of Bellingham,171 a worker injured by 
a defective passenger ramp at a port, brought an action seeking compensatory damages, pain and 
suffering, and lost consortium. Seeking to recover damages, the Court had to determine whether 
the port itself had possession—an essential component of liability—as a preemptive question 
before finding liability. The Court found that a possessor of land under the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts is “a person who occupies the land and controls it,”172 with the additional caveat in the 
comments as guidance that “[a] person is in control of the land if that person has the authority 
and ability to take precautions to reduce the risk of harm to entrants on the land.”173 In Adamson, 
 
169 See note 167, supra, at 207-208. 
170 Id. at 207.  
171 Adamson v. Port of Bellingham, 193 Wash. 2d 178, 438 P.3d 522 (2019).  
172 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 49 (2012).  
173 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 49 cmt. c (2012). The Court also loked to Comment D, which found considerable 
support for the notion that even a “possessor who cedes temporary control of property to another may be responsible 
as a possessor for conditions on the land that are not in the effective control of the other because of the temporal and 
practical limits of the other’s possession.” 
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the Court also turned to the Restatement (Second) of Torts and its own “common law of 
Restatements” to inform the standard that a possessor owes for potential hazards, citing to 
Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Society174 in support of the proposition that § 343 is “the 
appropriate standard for duties to invitees for known or obvious dangers.”175 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, in pertinent part, indicates that a possessor of 
land is subject to liability for physical harm, even if the property is leased to another, if he:  
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should 
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect 
themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.176 
 
In Adamson, the Court—relying on § 49 of the Restatement (Third) and § 343 of the 
Restatement (Second)—found that the port could be held liable because it was a possessor and it 
had failed to exercise the prerequisite of reasonable care in maintaining the passenger ramp. 
Thus, the Restatement here finds itself applied with deft attention to the expectations of liability 
therein and also the terms of the lease itself. Because the Court found that “the Port had access to 
the property to conduct maintenance; had the authority to unilaterally make changes to the 
property, while the lessee needed written permission; and the Port affirmatively contracted to 
repair and maintain with no provision requiring the lessee to repair and maintain,” it was liable to 
ensure the adequacy and structural integrity of the ramp.177 Adamson speaks to another aspect of 
Restatement application that has a direct and measurable impact on litigant recovery, viz. the 
interaction of Restatement principles with existing statutes and the common law. Contrary to the 
 
174 Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Society, 124 Wash.2d 121, 875 P.2d 621 (1994). See also: Ford v. Red Lion 
Inns, 67 Wash.App. 766, 840 P.2d 198 (1992), review denied, 120 Wash.2d 1029, 847 P.2d 481 (1993); Jarr v. 
Seeco Constr. Co., 35 Wash.App. 324, 666 P.2d 392 (1983); Swanson v. McKain, 59 Wash.App. 303, 796 P.2d 1291 
(1990). 
175 Id. at 139.  
176 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965).  
177 See note 170, supra, at 188.  
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Connecticut approach considered in Chapter II on contracts, Washington courts on questions of 
tort liability tend to address both their own common law adoptions and concurrently apply the 
black letter Restatement in order to buttress the rulings. In this respect, Adamson and its progeny 
reflect the fact that the Restatement cannot be studied in a void or be viewed as exclusively 
applied to particular areas of the law to satisfactorily resolve their disagreements. Instead, 
Restatement provisions such as § 402A function here as one resource to resolve and negotiate the 
complexities that often occur in apportioning liability in tort cases. 
For instance, one of the leading cases before the Court of Appeals subsequent to 
Adamson—Fowler v. Swift178—considered a premises liability action over a slip and fall injury 
caused by a staircase. In assessing whether liability and a duty of care could attach to the two 
second floor tenants of the building, rather than merely the building owner, the Court again 
turned to the same Restatement analysis adopted in Adamson. Here, however, there was a clear 
caution that the “threshold determination of whether a duty exists is a question of law” for the 
Court to decide independently, not merely one to be resolved under the auspices of the 
Restatement. Further, the Court reasoned that the Restatement’s expectations for possessors 
alone were insufficient to establish liability. Indeed, the additional step of the established 
common law doctrine was a prerequisite to finding liability. In Fowler, the Court found 
persuasive not merely the Restatement’s definition of possessor, but also the principle the Court 
had itself established in Minahan v. W. Wash. Fair Ass’n.179 There, on a question of premises 
liability against a high school by a teacher who suffered injuries at an event on a fairground, the 
Court found that “[w]here an owner divides their premises and rents certain parts to various 
 
178 Fowler v. Swift, 10 Wash. App. 2d 1038, amended and superseded on reconsideration, No. 51366-8-II, 2019 WL 
6881332 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019). See also: Coleman v. Hoffman, 115 Wn. App. 853, 64 P.3d 65 (2003).  
179 Minahan v. W. Wash. Fair Ass'n, 117 Wn. App. 881, 73 P.3d 1019 (2003).  
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tenants, while reserving other parts such as entrances and walkways for the common use of all 
tenants, it is the landlord's duty to exercise reasonable care and maintain those common areas in 
a safe condition unless otherwise specified in the lease.”180 The Court relied in Fowler on 
Minahan’s reasoning to potentially support two particular outcomes that contribute to an 
understanding of the Restatement’s function and application in Washington jurisprudence. First, 
the election of including Minahan reinforces and identifies that premises liability may be too 
complicated for a black letter Restatement to adequately state. There is a degree to which the 
common law, with its ability to subjectively assess notions such as reasonable care and impose 
long-presumed intentions of property maintenance (e.g., maintaining common areas) is the 
superior vehicle for ascertaining liability. Separately, the Court in Fowler speaks to the practical 
limitations of Restatement over possession that often seek to favor the injured litigant at the 
expense of the alleged tortfeasor. For example, on the black letter Restatement alone, a tenant 
would be expected to exercise a duty of care event absent possession by virtue of § 343a 
correlated with the plaintiff’s poor condition and health difficulties. What saves the defendants 
here is the presence of the common law as a remedy to a presumption of reasonable care in 
premises that are not their own. This finds accord with foundational tenants of real property for 
“most courts hold that the landlord has a common-law duty to exercise reasonable care to 
maintain common areas in a reasonably safe condition for the use of the tenant…and persons 
using the areas in right of the tenant” (emphasis mine).181 Interestingly, this same principle is 
embraced by the Restatement (Second) of Property (Landlord and Tenant), which holds that 
there exists a duty of “reasonable care” imposed on the landlord to disclose any “latent” defects 
 
180 See note 178, supra, at 891; see also Fowler, supra note 177, at 1038.  
181 SHELDON F. KURTZ, MOYNIHAN’S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 108 (6th ed. West Academic 
Pub., 2015).  
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in the premises and, to the extent known, the common areas and spaces also enjoyed by the 
tenant under the terms of the lease.182  
In this respect, Fowler demonstrates a potential inconsistency in the application of the 
Restatement itself, particularly when one principle (§ 343) might come into conflict with the 
common law tradition embraced by another Restatement in a separate subject area. Thus, here 
the value of the Restatement as a guide and not as a dictum is readily apparent: while it can serve 
to clarify and advance the interests of the law, it can also obfuscate the common law and bar 
courts from effectively applying the law by effectively considering the impact of prior decisions. 
Washington’s engagement with the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) of Torts 
extends into another realm that has a considerable impact on actions by applying the Restatement 
to questions of statutory construction and statutory remedies broadly in Washington courts. In 
Mathis v. Ammons,183 on an action for negligence against a tractor operator who had failed to 
adhere to a statutory requirement to display flashing lights on his vehicle. In Mathis, the Court 
outlined that aside from a general common law duty of ordinary care, a defendant can be subject 
to an additional duty that is distinct from ordinary care and may carry more significant 
expectations. To meet this standard, however, the Court in Mathis indicated that it will look to 
whether the statute meets a “four-part test drawn from the Restatement (Second) of Torts: The 
statute’s purposes, exclusively or in part, must be (1) to protect a class of persons that includes 
the person whose interest is invaded; (2) to protect the particular interest invaded; (3) to protect 
that interest against the kind of harm that resulted; and (4) to protect that interest against the 
particular hazard from which the harm resulted.”184 Further, the Court observes, when a statute 
 
182 Restatement (Second) of Property (Landlord and Tenant) § 17.1 (1977).  
183 Mathis v. Ammons, 84 Wash. App. 411, 928 P.2d 431 (1996), as amended on denial of reconsideration (Jan. 21, 
1997); see also: Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965).  
184 Id. at 416.  
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meets the expectations of the four-part test, a generic negligence action “will involve not just a 
common law duty to exercise ordinary care, but also a statutory duty to comply with whatever 
the pertinent statute says.”185 However, critical to this inquiry is still that the Restatement can 
effectively decide when duties concomitant to a negligence action can expand to include other 
types of duties in tort actions. The notion that a Court would defer to the Restatement to 
determine the situations in which a statute—an affirmative act by the legislature—is applicable 
offers one of the more significant demonstrations in the practical application of the law of the 
Restatement’s persuasive authority in judicial settings.  
 The Court found in Mathis that although the statute must pass muster under this test, the 
judge still retains some ability to apportion negligence: “If all reasonable minds would conclude 
that the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care, the judge can find negligence as a matter of 
law. If no reasonable mind could find that the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care, the 
judge can find the absence of negligence as a matter of law. In any other case, negligence is an 
issue for the trier of fact, even when the defendant breached a duty imposed by statute.”186 
Therefore, the judge still retains the authority and the ability—even if a statutory expectation was 
breached—to apply the law and determine whether a negligence action can attach. Further, 
Mathis and the analysis of § 286 applicability is further confounded by the introduction of the 
Restatement’s position that  
The fact that a legislative enactment requires a particular act to be done for the protection 
of the interests of a particular class of individuals does not preclude the possibility that 
the failure to do such an act may be negligence at common law toward other classes of 
persons. It also does not preclude the possibility that, in a proper case, the requirements 
of the statute may be considered as evidence bearing on the reasonableness of the actor's 
conduct.187 
 
185 See note 182, supra, at 416-17.  
186 Id. at 418-19.  
187 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 cmt. g (1965).  
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 In this respect, the Restatement takes a cautionary approach: it specifies a test for courts 
to adopt to determine the extent of negligence in relation to a statute, but it also acknowledges 
that common law negligence can still apply even absent the broader protection hat could be 
afforded by a statute. Here, though the Court of Appeals endorses § 286, the Supreme Court has 
yet to rule directly on the issue. Even so—again—the Washington courts seem to find persuasive 
the existence of a so-called “common law of Restatements” consisting of decisions which have 
turned favorably toward applying provisions such as § 286. In Mathis, the Court determined that 
this test could apply by reviewing decisions of the Supreme Court and lower courts which have 
applied the test in fragmentary components rather than as a united statement of the law, including 
Est. of Kelly By & Through Kelly v. Falin188 (applying the Restatement’s § 286 “class of 
persons” prong to the duty of care for a commercial vendor who sold liquor in contravention of a 
statute); Hansen v. Friend189 (applying Restatement’s § 286 “class of persons” prong in a 
wrongful death action against adults who had served a minor alcohol); and Schneider v. 
Strifert190 (applying the Restatement’s § 286 “particular interest” prong against a dog owner 
whose loose dog prompted a collision with a bicyclist), inter alia. The Mathis principle thus 
exhibits another aspect of Restatement adoption by the Courts in Washington: it is not always an 
affirmative adoption by the Supreme Court or the highest equivalent court of a state that is 
required for an effective declaration of the principle. Rather, the Restatement is often considered 
“adopted” not by explicit, wholesale declaration but through frequent citation and prevalence in 
the decisions of the court. This approach reflects both the Restatement’s guiding potential and its 
frequent reliance by judges across the spectrum of decisions.  
 
188 Est. of Kelly By & Through Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 896 P.2d 1245 (1995).  
189 Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 824 P.2d 483 (1992).  
190 Schneider v. Strifert, 77 Wash. App. 58, 888 P.2d 1244 (1995).  
 63 
 The last major appearance of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in Washington 
jurisprudence which merits consideration is the application again of § 343 and § 343A to 
questions of duty. Here, of interest to our study, is the decision to discard the common law 
“Massachusetts” rule regarding natural accumulations of snow and ice and attendant duties 
imposed by the injuries they may cause. In Iwai v. State, Emp. Sec. Dep’t,191 the Court 
considered a claim for injuries against sustained during a slip and fall on a patch of ice in a state 
parking lot. Prior to Iwai, the state had adopted the natural accumulation or so-called 
“Massachusetts Rule” that “landowners had no duty to protect invitees from conditions caused 
by natural accumulations of snow or ice.”192 In this context, however, the Court—rather than 
disturbing stare decisis—used the Restatement to force a reconsideration of a question that had 
divided appeals courts in Washington. 
 The Restatement’s § 343 and § 343A thus became in Iwai the “appropriate tests for 
determining landowner liability to invitees”193 and abrogated a recent Appeals Court decision, 
Schaeffer v. Woodhead,194 that had affirmed a case on summary judgment in favor of a defendant 
who had slipped in a store’s parking lot. Here, again, the Restatement comes into play in making 
whole avenues of recovery available to litigants: at common law, there was no recovery for 
“natural accumulations.” Iwai and its adoption of strict liability under § 343A changed that 
principle and reimagined opportunities for finding fault. Indeed, even when developing and 
promoting new theories of recovery, the Washington Court is careful to present the decision not 
as the creation and abrogation of existing law, but consistent with a line of previous decisions 
 
191 Iwai v. State, Emp. Sec. Dep’t, 129 Wash. 2d 84, 915 P.2d 1089 (1996).  
192 Id. at 91.  
193 Id. at 93.  
194 Schaeffer v. Woodhead, 63 Wash.App. 627, 821 P.2d 75 (1991).  
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that had moved in favor of the broad approach to duties and liability that § 343 and § 343A 
countenance, including Ford v. Red Lion Inns195 (rejecting accumulation rule and promoting § 
343 in a slip and fall by a hotel guest in a parking lot) and Geise v. Lee196 (imposing duty on 
mobile home owners under § 343 to keep the causeways between the homes clear of snow and 
ice), among others. These decisions, the Court reasoned, “taken together…reject the natural 
accumulation rule and impose Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 343 and 343A as the 
appropriate standards for determining landowner liability to invitees.”197 Thus, with these cases 
in support, the Court reasons that it is safe to rely on the Restatement. Washington jurisprudence, 
then, reflects not only a willingness to adopt the Restatement in the area of tortious liability, but 
also a particular focus on ensuring that the Restatement is applied and tested in a myriad of 
decisions before being considered “adopted” at the state level.  
 Further, the Court in Iwai also recognized and imposed a greater duty on government and 
state agencies to maintain reasonable care on their properties. The Restatement’s Comment G 
was relied on by the Court to establish that it is particularly important for duty when the land in 
question is “land upon which the public are invited and entitled to enter as a matter of public 
right.”198 Indeed, the Court found that the expectation of duty is even greater when the interests 
of a public utility or agency are incorporated and members of the public can expect to “encounter 
some known or obvious dangers which are not unduly extreme, rather than to forego the 
right.”199 Here the Court permitted the Restatement to direct and applied greater expectations of 
 
195 Ford v. Red  Lion Inns, 67 Wash.App. 766, 840 P.2d 198 (1992).  
196 Geise v. Lee, 84 Wash.2d 866, 529 P.2d 1054 (1975).  
197 See note 190, supra, at 95.  
198 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(2) cmt. g (1965).  
199 Id. § 353A(2) cmt. g reads, in pertinent part, as follows: “The same is true of the government, or a government 
agency, which maintains land upon which the public are invited and entitled to enter as a matter of public right. 
Such defendants may reasonably expect the public, in the course of the entry and use to which they are entitled, to 
proceed to encounter some known or obvious dangers which are not unduly extreme, rather than to forego the right. 
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reasonable care to the position that government defendants will be held to a higher expectation of 
compliance because of the particular nature of their services and their position.  
Also, unique to Washington’s adoption of the provision in natural accumulation cases 
was the caveat that “[t]he standards imposed by these sections do not distinguish between 
artificial and natural conditions—the duty to protect invitees from harm is the same in both 
situations.”200 This, too, reflects another aspect of Restatement adoption at the state level: the sua 
sponte expansion of the principle even absent direct guidance from the Restatement by the Court. 
In this sense, there is an underlying current of judicial activism: nowhere does the Restatement 
differentiate between artificial and natural conditions, and nowhere in their briefs did the plaintiff 
or defendant address this difference. The Restatement, then, becomes an adaptable and fluid 
vehicle for the formation of the state’s common law and frequently becomes attenuated, as here, 
with additional requirements or impositions that can expand their scope and adjust their 
influence. This same principle is exhibited again in Iwai and analogous cases as the Court does 
not merely allow liability to attach and duty to form under § 343. Instead, a plaintiff must also 
prove in a premises liability action that the “landowner had actual or constructive notice of the 
unsafe condition”201 or, alternatively, that the condition had existed for enough time “as would 
have afforded [the defendant] sufficient opportunity, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have 
made a proper inspection of the premises and to have removed the danger.”202 Again, this 
additional burden imposed on the plaintiff in a premises action is absent from the Restatement. It 
 
Even such defendants, however, may reasonably assume that members of the public will not be harmed by known or 
obvious dangers which are not extreme, and which any reasonable person exercising ordinary attention, perception, 
and intelligence could be expected to avoid. This is true particularly where a reasonable alternative way is open to 
the visitor, known or obvious to him, and safe.” See note 197, supra.  
200 See note 190, supra, at 95.  
201 Id. at 96. See also: Ingersoll v. DeBartolo, Inc., 123 Wash.2d 649, 869 P.2d 1014 (1994). 
202 Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 100 Wash.2d 39, 666 P.2d 888 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Manning's, Inc., 13 Wash.2d 
573, 126 P.2d 44 (1942)).  
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reflects, perhaps, an effort by the Court to balance the increased scope of liability imposed on 
landowners under § 343 against their interests in operating and existing free from vexatious and 
constant fear of litigation.  
Washington’s adoption, here, of provisions of the Restatement (Second) and Restatement 
(Third) of Torts addresses the full breadth of aspiration and activism that the Restatements can 
introduce into the judicial realm. As Arthur Goodhart observes in his early review of the 
Restatement, there is present in American tort law a distinct sense of the “punitive or moral 
element that seems to be stronger in American law than it is in the English. Throughout the 
Restatement the rule seems to be that if the actor does an act which is wrongful as to A then B 
can recover if he is incidentally injured by it, even though as to him the actor has acted neither 
intentionally nor negligently.”203 In its own adoption of Restatement provisions, Washington has 
demonstrated an acute aversion in many cases to leaving litigants without opportunities or 
theories of recovery. Though certain decisions such as Little may limit the scope of recovery, all 
judicial decisions and limitations seem employed with an eye toward the impact on both parties 
to an action.  
Washington thus provides, along with Connecticut, two separate approaches to 
Restatement application that help in a broad consideration of Restatement policy implications. In 
the case of the former, Washington, the focus is often on balancing interests and providing 
opportunities for recovery when the common law is at conflict with the pace of Restatement 
advancement. In the case of the latter, Connecticut, the focus in contract actions is often the 
promotion and protection of business interests. This result, considered further in Chapter IV, 
infra, may well be the result of the nature of the law and the states’ historical judicial interests.  
 
 
203 Arthur L. Goodhart, Restatement of the Law of Torts, 83 PENN. L. REV. 4, 416 (1935). 
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Chapter IV. The Restatements and Litigant Rights—Understanding and 
Assessing the Impact of Decisions and Recovery  
 
 Assessing and interpreting the results of the Restatements as a judicial instrument is a 
difficult task. Decisions are issued and applied, but each affords relief to individual litigants and 
is not generally viewed as part of some great judicial philosophy or dictum that is reviewed and 
studied. Rarely—outside the line of Constitutional interpretation over specific issues—are cases 
considered as instructive and consistent on areas of the law such as relief. Moreover, there is no 
comprehensive study of the Restatements’ application in particular areas that the author is aware 
of, aside from a scattering of critical interpretations in law journals, and these do not directly 
address the question of how judicial adoption of the Restatements directly impacts litigation 
outcomes and the results realized by participants in the judicial process. Further, studies of the 
Restatements are not often considered in assessments of decisions at the state level and their role 
in interpreting and overruling state common law principles: in other words, to state jurists, they 
are applied but often invisible in contemporary bar discussion, which tends to focus on the 
applications of the Restatements nationally.  
In this case, our review of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in Connecticut and the 
Restatement (Second) and (Third) of Torts in Washington afford a first step in considering the 
realities of the Restatement’s influence and their place in shaping judicial decision making 
among state litigants and, specifically, how state participants see their outcomes directed. 
Ultimately, we can use the Restatements’ applications here to understand what the consolidation 
of the common law and, in other cases, erosion of its principles mean for the awards of damages 
and recovery and for judgments and results, which constitute the principal concerns for litigants. 
Further, the state of the Restatement and its applications at the state level suggest that there is a 
real opportunity for further study on how litigants have seen their opportunities expand and 
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retract since the Restatements introduction, particular when we consider their persuasiveness and 
presence in judicial circles. In an interview for this disquisition, American Law Institute Director 
Richard Revesz has observed that the Restatements as a whole underwent a major shift during 
the administration of ALI Director Herbert Wechsler in the 1960s that adjusted their focus and 
sought to concentrate on consistency issues. Revesz noted that Wechsler’s principal 
contributions were to recognize “that the ALI needed to consider statutory law passed by 
legislatures as well as common law developed by courts.”204How much has this notion been 
realized? How much has this notion been realized? In the case of Connecticut, for instance, the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts does not seem to have been concerned with statutory 
interpretations. Indeed, the legislature in the context of contracts has largely deferred from 
interacting with and directly addressing contract issues. In this absence, can the Restatement’s 
aim in fact be realized? Perhaps only in certain areas of the law, such as Washington, where 
courts have sought to address the development of torts and evaluating the viability of certain 
statutes under a four-part test articulated in the Restatement.205 For instance, Revesz in some 
respects predicts the reality in Washington, noting that certain states have “enacted statutes 
addressing issues that previously were controlled by judge-made rules, such as the choice among 
contributory and comparative liability regimes in torts.”206 This development in the Restatement 
speaks to the contemporary impact that they can have: they can direct the consolidation of the 
common law and also act responsively (and in relation to) legislative statutes. 
Ian MacNeil has observed that the development of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
was guided by resolving an essential need for clarity. MacNeil argues that “the question raised is 
 
204 Interview with Richard Revesz, Director, American Law Institute, in New York, NY. (Jan. 4, 2021).  
205 See Chapter III, supra, at 55-56 for a discussion of the nexus between statutes and the Restatement in the context 
of Mathis.  
206 See note 204, supra.  
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a more basic one concerning the wisdom of attempting to restate anew the law of transactional 
contracts at a time when so much contract law concerns relations which much of the 
transactional doctrine is so ill-fitted to serve.”207 MacNeil addresses two central aspects of the 
Restatement of Contracts that are embodied in the Connecticut jurisprudence: the need for 
uniformity, specifically in the context of commercial transactions, and the need for a 
Restatement that effectively allows for more efficient commercial transactions between states. 
Thus, MacNeil asserts, the Restatement of Contracts and its development had to be cautionary to 
the extent that it did not take on the task “of developing new doctrines to link and describe the 
principles underling the similarities in behavior.”208 Indeed, by taking this course of action, the 
reporters of the Restatement of Contracts understood that their primary objective was to 
capitalize on a “body of doctrine already considerably developed not only by the formal 
lawmakers such as courts, administrative agencies and legislatures, but also developed in the 
scholarly sense and, above all in the customs and manners of the society.”209 The focus here is 
placed on the Restatement’s ability to unify a disparate and existing body of law from a myriad 
of sources. Even so, MacNeil’s optimistic projection is not always borne out in practice but 
rather realized only in certain situations where the law and the precise interests of the 
Restatement align.  
 As exhibited in the Connecticut caselaw, there is a clear distinction placed between the 
Restatement acting to supplement the common law and to replace it. In Gibson, considered 
supra, the Court supplemented the principles and interpretations of the foundational concept of 
the freedom to contract.210 The purpose of supplementing and clarifying existing law was 
 
207 Ian R. MacNeil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VIRGINIA L. REV. 609 (1974).  
208 See note 207, supra.  
209 See note 207, supra, at 609.  
210 For the full analysis of Gibson, see the discussion in Chapter II, supra, at 22-23. 
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recognized as a central principle by Revesz, who observed that among their primary goals is “to 
aid not just judges but also strive to advance the understanding of the law more generally.”211 
Particularly with respect to contract formation, then, one aim of the Restatement of Contracts 
was to make the principles and norms of commercial transactions commonly known by the 
contracting parties. Even so, Connecticut cases did foreclose some of these opportunities for 
balance, opting instead—especially in common law “lost volume” cases such as Gianetti.212 It is 
thus difficult to assess whether the Restatements in fact achieve their objective of balance: the 
official position may reflect that the Restatements seek to state the law as it is, but the reality is 
often muddled in particular practice areas. All of this, of course, results in an acute impact on the 
litigation strategies and the types of claims that can be brought by litigants.    
 Central to assessing whether or not the Restatement is in fact effective is not only a study 
of the extant case law, but also a recognition of why the Restatement’s reporters may depart from 
the majority position. Revesz has indicated that, as with judicial decisions, “determining when to 
follow a minority rule requires judgment.” Ultimately, Revesz contends, “a Restatement might 
find that a majority approach to a question creates unintended consequences in another area of 
the law,” but indicates that the ALI “relies on its lengthy and transparent drafting process to 
ensure we get these determinations right.”213 This effort of engaging in that transparent process 
and departing from the majority rule was at play in Washington’s consideration of strict product 
liability in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, examined in Chapter III. Here, the 
Restatement adopted the minority approach for reasons that have been the subject of 
 
211 See note 204, supra. 
212 For the full analysis of Gianetti, see the discussion in Chapter II, supra, at 29-31.  
213 See note 204, supra. 
 71 
considerable debate and disagreement and elected to depart from the previously accepted 
common law tradition in favor of this novel approach.  
 In making these departures from the accepted dictates of the common law, Fred Helms 
has observed that the Restatements, particularly in advancing their view on tort liability, have 
“forced the courts to look at law review articles to determine the present majority rule on strict 
liability.”214 Indeed, “instead of giving the courts an authoritative, determinative source with 
which at least to begin the decision-making process, the Restatements are in danger of being 
treated as merely worthwhile treatises.”215 Helms’ contention is clear: the Restatements must 
avoid playing an activist role precisely because such activism would merely make them another 
treatise with suggestions or thoughts on the law could be improved. Further, it would erode their 
purpose as the standard bearer and expositor of the common law tradition in particular subject 
areas. Helms’ point, however, appears to have fallen on deaf ears in our evaluation of the 
Restatements. While many provisions do turn on the question of what was intended by the 
common law tradition, others turn to focus on aspirational goals. The apportioning of liability 
and ability to recover damages, particularly in Washington, is at odds with existing 
jurisprudence. All of this suggests that, in some respect, the Restatements have expanded beyond 
their intentions and aims and turned their focus to advancing particular legal aims.  
 Revesz, in his interview, noted that the “Restatements do not purport to be controlling 
law” and “serve as useful secondary sources to aid judicial interpretation and advance 
understanding more generally.”216 This, however, is not necessarily the reality of how the 
Restatements are applied in practice. Indeed, while they are not controlling in the sense of the 
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common law, courts have adopted when convenient—as evidenced by the case studies—the 
Restatements as sufficient authority to justify a change in existing practice. Helms, too, seems to 
recognize that though the Restatements may not purport to be controlling, they still have as their 
aim a future outcome. Specifically, Helms notes, the Restatement process has come to fear that it 
will have been “on the edge of becoming dated before it is published,” specifically with respect 
to issues such as strict liability. In this sense, then, Helms suggests that the Restatements, in 
developing legal disciplines such as torts, sacrificed the common law interest in order to remain 
relevant. This same sense of relevancy seems apparent in the Washington courts, particularly as 
strict liability regimes are considered and assigned. Helms, meanwhile, insists that we recognize 
that it “will always be possible for the men responsible for restating the law to envision changes, 
but no combination of experts can predict accurately and no reference point is as understandable 
and as useful as the present. The best tool for re-evaluation is a restatement of how things are 
now.”217 The Restatements, then, have long proven contentious for the careful balance that they 
strike as aspects of legal practice: a citable reference for judicial actors, but also a policy 
apparatus that helps to advance specific, identifiable aims from within the legal community.  
 § 402A’s adoption in Washington, for instance, provides one example of a Restatement 
provision which fundamentally afforded a new scheme under which litigants could seek 
recovery. For example, notes Herbert Titus in an early response, just five years after its adoption 
by the ALI in 1964, state courts “in at least 15 jurisdictions have embraced the strict tort liability 
rule” in § 402A and “other courts have commented favorably…and have used it as a helpful 
guide in resolving cases involving traditional warranty liability.”218 Thus, the Restatement—
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though not controlling—is regularly persuasive in directing judicial outcomes at the state level. 
Titus also notes that “none of these courts had questioned the accuracy of the case law cited by 
the American Law Institute…and none has given serious consideration to the question [of] 
whether a jurisdiction’s enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code precludes judicial adoption 
of the strict liability rule.”219 The danger, then, in a Restatement is not necessarily its content but 
that an errant court may rely without understanding the scope of the supporting comment or the 
authorities it relies upon. The adherence and trust of the courts in the Restatements, even without 
conducting additional research, speaks to both their weight and their importance within the legal 
community. If they are accepted at face value, as was the case with § 402A in certain 
jurisdictions, the ALI is thus invested with considerable power to state more than what the law is 
and turn its attention to what the law ought to be. Likewise, it becomes easier to see how quickly 
the Restatements’ principles can find themselves judicially adopted. This degree of power, and 
the attendant results it can have on judicial outcomes, suggests that the Restatements may be 
more persuasive than at first glance. It is this concern that is frequently raised by critics, 
especially when the matter before the court can directly adjust the expectations of litigants.   
 As Titus asserts, § 402A and the adoption of widespread strict liability systems was 
enabled and accelerated by the introduction of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. For instance, 
he adds, courts “that have adopted the strict tort liability rules of section 402A have ignored 
these critics” and, more distressing than this, there is an “apparent ‘overanxiousness’ [sic] of 
courts to take part in the ‘dramatic fall of the citadel’” that was previously the bedrock of limited 
liability schemes.220 Here, then, is another principal concern of the Restatements with respect to 
their practical application in the courts: even if the ALI itself does not consider itself to be 
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controlling, the courts do in many areas of the law and fall back on the extant Restatements as 
persuasive when it is judicially efficient to do so. This “judicial boldness,” suggests Titus, 
revolves around the view that the Restatement “presume[s] to be good law” when, in reality, the 
entire enterprise often relies on minority rules that may help to subjectively move the law 
forward.221   
 This judicial boldness extends, too, beyond the scope of state actions. As Revesz added, 
at the federal level and in federal process and procedure, the ALI Has “expressly taken up these 
questions.”222 ALI initiatives have included a Study of the Business of the Federal Courts223 in 
the 1930s and a Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts224 in the 
1950s and 1960s. In both cases, the ALI appears to function as a policy advocate on issues of 
uniformity and efficiency. Similar to the Restatements, it is this difficulty in balancing and 
competing objectives that confound what otherwise may be noble aims: the Restatements cannot 
be both aspirational and objective in their observations on law, at least not if they wish to be 
presented as impartial and well-sourced treatises. Further, Revesz observed, the Supreme Court 
has more recently turned to the Restatement to clarify an issue on which state and federal 
authorities were divided. In McDonough v. Smith,225 the Court found that the Restatement 
(Second) of Tort’s proposition of fabricated evidence was sufficient to dictate the federal 
standard. Even here, however, we are left with the question of how much the Court relied on 
their trust in the Restatement process when rendering a decision: how can we be certain of the 
caselaw that is selected and how can a court be confident that the rule or rules they select in fact 
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speak to the majority opinion? These issues appear to, in some degree, beset the effectiveness of 
the Restatements and leave an uncertain field for those who approach the courts seeking judicial 
relief. Is the relief they seek a majority view or are the principles the court has adopted consistent 
with the common law tradition it has indicated it prefers to uphold?  
 Again, this trepidation toward the Restatements’ construction and outlook is not a new 
phenomenon. However, as James Henderson and Aaron Twerski have observed, whether the 
Restatement may be understood as the result of “political” interactions responding to different 
constituencies ultimately depends on how you define and understand the term “politics” itself. 
Henderson and Twerski, who analyze the revisions to the products liability portion of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts and were in fact instrumental in its drafting,226 have posited that “if 
the term ‘political’ is defined as used in common parlance, then we categorically assert that 
external political pressures played no role in influencing our participation in the Products 
Restatement. At no time did any individual or group threaten to withhold support or approval 
unless we succumbed to making a change with which we disagreed as to the substantive 
merits.”227 However, Henderson and Twerski contend, if the term “political” is broadened to 
include the “art of opening up the process to persons with varying views of public policy, 
engaging them in dialogue, and responding on the merits to their criticisms and suggestions 
regarding what the law is and should be,” then we “plead guilty to having ‘played politics’ in the 
first degree.”228 This distinction is important for two reasons. First, there is something of a legal 
fiction created by suggesting that policy interests and influences do not direct the real outcomes 
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embodied in the Restatements, and second, this admission affirms one of the most compelling 
critiques of Restatement adoption: even if they are constructed with an aim toward uniformity, 
they still admit to an inherent susceptibility (and willingness to engage) policy interests. 
 In some cases, one might view this engagement of policy interests as a good thing: if we 
reach a compromise and consensus on issues such as, say, the proper apportionment of damages 
in particular actions, could we not offer more uniformity in results to litigants? Would it not be a 
better judicial outcome if those who suffered similar injuries were entitled to equal relief on 
similar triable issues? Perhaps—but as David Owen has argued—this is fundamentally at odds 
with the disparate impact that particular injuries suffered can have depending on a variety of 
social and economic factors. The Restatement (Third)’s approach to “rejecting section 402A’s 
approach of defining defectiveness…obviated the need for a global test of liability based on 
some traditional liability touchstone such as consumer expectations or negligence.”229 Rather, 
suggests Owen, the Restatement (Second) of Torts introduced a new test that was not burdened 
with the traditional common law views of negligence that made effective remedies for litigants 
possible. Even so, Owen cautions, a concern of the Restatements is also their limiting and, one 
might even suggest, chilling effect on tort claims based on emotional appeals: the approach taken 
by the Restatement (Second) (and adopted in some form in Washington courts) is “devoid of the 
lively clash of claims of right and wrong that marked the early years” of tort development, but 
results in some increase in uniformity in judicial decisions. Still, each case which comes before a 
court must, in theory, be measured on its own merits, the need for relief can often correspond to 
the harm caused: an automobile accident, with respect to the measure of compensatory damages 
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(and antecedent claims such as lost wages or loss of consortium), would certainly have a 
different impact on the quality of life for a single mother with few assets compared to a banker.  
 While at some level this comparison may appear simplistic, one of the drawbacks of 
wholesale Restatement adoption may be their ability to curb judicial discretion on equity issues 
such as damage apportionment and assessments. Though the Restatement on its own is not 
controlling or binding, when a state Supreme Court—be it Connecticut, Washington, or some 
other jurisdiction—adopts it as persuasive, it does become binding under stare decisis on courts 
within the same jurisdiction. Because tort actions generally begin their judicial life in superior 
courts (or courts of similar jurisdiction), the adoption of the Restatement can have significant 
impacts on the tort claims brought by litigants from the inception of litigation. Further, by setting 
the scope and limitations of claims in a manner contrary to the common law at the outset, 
litigants are left with an unsatisfying paradox: our courts have historically ruled allowable certain 
actions and premises but have now overridden them through recent adoption of a foreign, in the 
jurisdictional sense, Restatement.  
 Doubtless, there is a need for consistency in certain decisions. However, as Mark 
Geistfeld has argued, decisions in tort claims, especially around liability and distress, cannot be 
reduced to objective principles and maintain their coherence. Indeed, Geistfeld contends, the 
“problem of coherence arises because a rationale for negligence liability applies to other tort 
doctrines. The justification for negligence liability in the Restatement (Third) proceeds from the 
compelling premise that one ought not engage in wrongful behavior and should be obligated to 
compensate others for the harmful consequences of such behavior. This justification depends on 
a conception of wrongful behavior.”230 In other words, because tort liability is premised on a 
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subjective notion of wrongful behavior, there are always going to be aberrations in the case law 
that are inconsistent with what we might consider appropriate remedies for the harms inflicted. 
Because of this, the Restatement’s efforts to unify and effectively state compensatory schemes or 
measures of damages may take away an important contribution that the common law provides: 
an ability to focus on the merits of the case and not become tethered to a rigid scheme or existing 
structure that ensures that a complaint is determined and disposed without regard to its particular 
accusations and merits.  
 This also speaks to Owen’s contentions, particularly that the Restatement does not always 
follow the prevailing sentiment and may act to in fact work against the interest of litigants 
seeking recovery or the interests of defendants in maintaining that uniformity. Specifically, 
Owen observes that “while plaintiffs may decry the abandonment of consumer expectations as 
the explicit test of liability in the new Restatement, defendants surely would have wished for a 
more complete return to negligence as the explicit test of products liability.”231 In this sense, the 
Restatement does not always satisfy either party nor does it reflect a prioritization of interests. 
Even with this factor introduced, the Restatement still at times evidently favors particular 
interests: strict liability provisions certainly do not defer to business interests and privilege the 
recovery interests of the injured. 
 The abandonment of negligence and the introduction of strict liability as evidenced by the 
Washington line of cases epitomizes the role of the Restatement as a policy instrument. For 
example, strict liability, which lacks a basis in the traditional notions of negligence upon which 
the common law is predicated, represents the implementation of a key policy objective for those 
engaged in the representation of plaintiffs in tort practice. Owen argues that “the very definition 
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of defectiveness in section 402A was explicitly rooted in consumer expectations…[t]he 
fundamental exceptional value rests on the central importance of truth to individuals attempting 
to make intelligent choices in exercising their free wills.”232 There is, thus, the presence in the 
Restatement of Torts of a responsiveness to the judicial demands and interests of individuals. 
Still, it seems difficult to comport the privileging of individual interests here with the realities of 
an ALI process which is presented as inclusive of many of the parties that § 402A in its final 
form works against.  
 Instead, we might understand the Restatement’s as imperfect representations of various 
policy interests at a given moment. Certainly, the notion of strict liability—at odds with the 
common law tradition—was a key departure in the Restatement (Second). Perhaps in response to 
this, the ALI adjusted strict liability for products with the Restatement (Third) but—critically—
many states, including Washington, have continued to operate under the extant principles. This 
demonstrates the dangers that Restatement adoption can have. Because they are not controlling 
and require adoption, there is no default adjustment to the law as there might be for a statutory 
scheme that succeeds a previous one. In this respect, the Restatements can prove difficult to 
correct if prevailing sentiment forces an adjustment. The marked shift between the Restatement 
(Second) and the Restatement (Third) on the matter of strict liability means that judicial 
outcomes differ significantly by state: Washington adheres by the old system under the 
Restatement (Second), whereas other states may elect to follow the advisories of the Restatement 
(Third). If the object of the Restatement is to introduce judicial uniformity and aid in decision-
making, having different, operative forms of the Restatements that are at odds with each other 
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permits a dangerous step in the judicial process. Judges could, in theory, apply the Restatement 
of their preference.  
 Thus, the question becomes: can the Restatement’s issues be remedied, and can it still 
prove an effective judicial instrument? Despite these issues, George Conk has argued that there 
is an unavoidable reality of the Restatement: that there is real power in the “black letter rule of 
law and the tendency of the Restatement’s explanatory comments to become authoritative texts 
that set the terms of debate for many years.”233 Indeed, the Restatement remains effective, 
particularly in aiming to state what the law is, with an addendum of what the law may be. Conk 
also identifies a second aspect that makes the Restatements a powerful instrument for judicial 
reformation and development: their imprimatur carries considerable weight in making policy 
changes accepted, particularly among the legal community. Conk notes that the adoption of § 
402A, which came after previous efforts to implement strict liability schemes in New Jersey and 
California, “imparted credibility to this effort because of the prestige of the ALI and the strong 
consensus among its leading voices that strict liability was the proper rule…with the issuance [of 
the Restatement], the concept of strict liability for defective products became 
institutionalized.”234 Therefore, the Restatements serve the purpose of imparting judicial and 
institutional legitimacy to the legal theories and proposals that are first tested in jurisdictions. 
Even with this in mind, however, the Restatement (Second) of Torts continues to present a 
challenge, viz. the uncertainty to litigants that comes with the inconsistent judicial applications of 
the Restatement principles. 
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 While the Restatement (Second) of Torts is among the treatises that has generated the 
most animated opposition from varied sects of academia and from the legal community broadly, 
our study of contracts also suggests that corporate interests and priorities can be considerably 
impacted by the introduction of Restatement principles that are at odds with the common law. 
For instance, Connecticut’s adoption of § 264, examined supra, and its reliance on Restatement 
definitions in reviewing litigation around a West Haven referendum and its influence on a 
property development project. This had a material outcome on a contract interest and resulted in 
a tangible adjustment of the expectations that the parties had when entering into a contract and 
taking subsequent action. As Joseph Perillo has observed, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
is particularly interested in the awarding of damages and restitution: characterizing these 
provisions as combining “outworn dogma with audacious innovation,” Perillo argues that the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts has expanded “to encompass also restitution following 
avoidance of contract on grounds of fraud, duress, mistake, and the like, and following discharge 
because of impracticability, frustration of purpose, and similar circumstances.”235 Again, 
however, what is interesting is that the Restatement’s inquiry and inclusion of awards of 
damages in some form—in this case those that are restitutionary—adjusts the calculus from 
merely stating the existing law in rendering judicial decisions. Instead, the Restatement now 
affords important guidance on the outcomes that litigants can expect in contract actions and the 
opportunities for recovery that are imposed by the treatise. 
 In this respect, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts acts similar to Torts in that both 
offer codifications of accepted principles (such as the elements of contract formation), but also 
seek to advance new agendas and interests that permit the court to take specific policy 
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provisions. For instance, in the realm of contracts, allowing for specific forms of restitution 
demonstrates the impact that a contracts Restatement can have on litigant recovery. Further, as 
Perillo contends, the inclusion of restitution provisions in the Restatement (Second) speaks not to 
capturing the existing law, but to harkening back to earlier legal provisions and theories. Indeed, 
Perillo notes, the restitution provisions are “reminiscent of the first two decades of the twentieth 
century” and, speaking on reliance, rebuff “the authorities that protect the reliance interest in 
actions for restitution.”236 The Restatement, then, is not always concerned with the existing state 
of the law and can at times identify different sources on which to base its authority. In the case of 
contracts, restitution principles markedly diverge from their standards at the start of the twentieth 
century and again reflects a preference for privileging particular legal interests over others.  
Perillo also notes that among the chief contributions of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts is its understanding that “justice does not require that the same measure of recovery 
always be used” and, in fact, restitution and recovery should be viewed as “either the market 
value of the plaintiff’s performance or the ‘extent to which the other party’s property has been 
increased in value or his other interests advanced.’”237 Again, the focus here is not on affording 
discretion, but on providing concrete guidance to judicial decision makers who may have to 
consider the scope of recovery allowable and the premises on which that recovery should be 
based. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts thus introduces another element to the recovery 
options for litigants and relies on authorities to reach its conclusions which may not per se be the 
majority. For Perillo, the Restatement’s restitution provisions serve justice well. This may not be 
the case, however, for corporate defendants faced with significant restitution dues under a 
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Restatement scheme that diverges from the model that was previously considered established 
law. It is unlikely that their policy interests of indemnity are served in the restitution provisions.  
 What these case studies demonstrate is that a considered review of the Restatements 
offers insight into how judicial decisions are made and what factors influence their outcome. In 
the case of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Restatement (Second) and (Third) of 
Torts, the impacts on litigant interests and awards are apparent. What is difficult to rectify, 
however, is that the law of the Restatements is not always consistent with the common law 
approach or with the statutory direction. Though they are not controlling, as Revesz has 
indicated, to do their job well “it is important that judges and other readers be able to turn to a 
Restatement for an accurate description of the state of existing law and for a reasoned 
explanation of why the ALI has adopted one approach to a legal question rather than another.”238 
Implicit in that response is a sense of the Restatement as both a codification of what the existing 
law is but also an aspirational document which, on particular policy issues, adopts a minority or 
dissenting view over the existing majority position. 
 Although the law cannot be understood in a vacuum divorced from policy interests, the 
objectives of the ALI inherently constitute a different focus than those that may occupy a judge 
making a decision on the merits of a case before him. Advancing a particular policy persuasion 
supported by the academy (or supported by a Reporter and ALI members), may serve a discreet 
judicial purpose or satisfy a long-standing interest. An emphasis on increased uniformity in 
judicial decision making may not always have the positive outcome for the adequate 
representation of interests precisely because the law must have some measure of malleability 
when it comes to making awards for damages or deciding particularly contentious issues.  
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 The case studies here demonstrate that the Restatements, particularly in the areas of 
contracts and torts, can have a positive impact through their adoption of tests and measures for 
particular claims. Even so, the Restatements are also a policy instrument that can prompt change 
in judicial practice and also serve (as was the case with the more contentious § 402A) as a 
catalyst that affirms and provides legitimacy to more radical judicial developments introduced in 
state courts. As Revesz noted in his interview, it is clear that the usefulness of the Restatements 
is in part the fact that they serve the purpose of “clarifying, modernizing, and otherwise 
improving the law across a range of contexts.”239 The Restatement, then, states the law as it is 
but also acts to modernize it. Implicit in the ALI’s understanding of its own mission is a sense 
that the law can be consistently improved, and that the Restatement is a vehicle that can be used 
to advance the policy and judicial aims of uniformity and, in some cases, subjective views of 
equity. 
 In considering the development of the Restatements and their use as policy tools, it 
becomes evident that they serve an important purpose. Nevertheless, they still remain a legal 
project without the oversight of the full judicial process itself and one that is developed 
independent of the common law tradition on which our judicial system is predicated. The 
privileging of these minority interests at times appears contradictory with the stated aims of the 
Restatement process but remains available as a critical policy apparatus that can pursue and 
advance specific aims. The Restatements are a valuable resource for judicial uniformity and 
improvement—but their influence, insofar as pursuing the aim of ensuring that policies last in 
perpetuity—might be best served by amending the process and ensuring that it recognizes the 
implicit interests that are realized in the Restatements themselves.  
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Conclusion. The Restatements as a Policy Issue: Practical Solutions and 
Changes for the Advancement of the Law  
 
As we have considered, the Restatements are an important policy device that are 
regularly relied on in making judicial decisions and determinations, and they can have a 
considerable impact in the development of new legal traditions, viz. by providing a foundation 
for minority positions and ideals to take hold in the courts. The courts of Connecticut and 
Washington have come to rely on the Restatements to clarify the law but also to advance discreet 
policy objectives while also turning to them for clear statements of the law. Charting a path 
forward for the Restatements requires a deliberate exercise in restraint and also a recognition that 
decisions which contradict the common law will inherently result in potential opposition from 
certain sects of the judiciary. With this concern in mind, adjustments to the Restatement process, 
especially around contentious provisions, would permit for a wider acceptance of Restatement 
principles and the more efficient operation of the law.  
 In our study here, the Restatements’ potential challenges have been demonstrated in an 
assessment of their practical applications at the state level. Conflict with the Restatement and the 
common law has resulted in mixed outcomes and, in some cases, has come to result in the 
replacement of state decisions with the uniform Restatement. This outcome, however, regularly 
works against the clarity that the ALI seeks. Litigants are left with uncertainty about the sources 
of law and the rules enforced against them and find themselves discontented with a court system 
that emphasizes uniformity at the expense of situations that may be particular to certain states 
and certain state legal systems in our federal system. This is not to suggest that the existing 
Restatement process is inconsequential in remedying some of these concerns, but there exists 
real opportunity to reform the process in a way that focuses on how the ALI can effectively 
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balance the competing sets of interests that arise to advocate for the adoption of a particular 
policy provision.  
Further, the Restatements are in need of reformation, particularly relative to those 
provisions which seek to supplant the common law and advance a specific group’s legal aims. 
While many of the Restatements’ principles are noble and aim to make substantive progress in 
particular areas of the law, their application and development via the avenue of the Restatements 
can lead to contradictions with existing state jurisprudence, often at the expense of the interests 
of litigants. These Restatement provisions also stand to place limitations on the effective 
development of the law and toward adequately reflecting the desires and beliefs of litigants. An 
effective remedy to these concerns would take into account the fact that the Restatements are not 
controlling but acknowledge that their basis in common law traditions (and embrace, on 
occasion, of minority opinions) provide for a wide array of cases on which to properly assess and 
measure the legal realities that develop as a result of their release.   
Thus, the ALI should strongly consider developing and publishing with the issuance of 
the Restatements impact assessments which take into account the particular realities of certain 
jurisdictions, especially on those Restatement provisions which markedly diverge from the 
existing common law of jurisdictions. While this aim may not be practicable to compile for all 
states, the ALI could certainly propose a system that would track implementation in certain 
jurisdictions around controversial or novel provisions and could release timely reports to advise 
judges on the potential impacts to litigant interests that could develop as a result of adoption. The 
purpose of these reports would be two-fold: first, the release of candid assessments of the impact 
of certain Restatement principles on existing state law would better permit judges to assess and 
make decisions based not only on a particular minority interest, but with the full scope of the 
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possible implications considered. Second, judicial decision makers would also be able to better 
balance interests by being apprised to the potential conflicts that the ALI and others within the 
legal academy foresee and counter those conflicts in the strategic issuance and drafting of their 
rulings.    
The effective implementation of these reports would require an independent set of 
decision makers and reporters at the ALI but would also provide a valuable opportunity as well 
to state for the record the full scope of potential disagreement and dissent from among the 
members of the ALI. In this sense, these reports may in fact afford an opportunity for those 
members of the ALI who disagree with the adoption of a minority rule to consider and examine 
the implications of the Restatement. The development of these non-partisan reports would also 
provide the Restatement reporters with an opportunity to consider the practicality of 
implementing what are originally abstract legal concepts. In this sense, the Restatements 
themselves could be made stronger by effectively examining the common law and then 
following up with a report on the actual judicial impacts of Restatement provisions.  
With these reports, too, the ALI could also work to remedy issues of consistency and 
preference for certain Restatement provisions on a more frequent schedule than the issuance of 
an entire Restatement. For instance, our case study of Washington and § 402A on strict liability 
has revealed adoption, but we have also considered here the wide disagreement and concern 
within policy circles for strict liability regimes. In some cases, the Restatement of Torts (Third) 
responded to and attempted to clarify the strict liability laid out in the Restatement (Second). 
Likewise, in Connecticut, changing conditions and expectations in the formation of contracts, 
such as the Appellate Court’s adoption of a multifactor test in the determination of contract 
performance examined supra, speak to the challenges presented by the adoption of Restatement 
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provisions. How can business be effectively conducted if there is a lack of clarity and a conflict 
between the common law conditions which have endured and the novel theories of the 
Restatement? Clarity cannot be afforded by merely issuing the Restatement. Rather, it must be 
issued with an understanding that new developments and legal ideas in the Restatement must be 
communicated and clarified to the decision makers in state courts, especially when such 
adjustments presage a change in the majority position.  
Thus, having reports that regularly assess judicial preference for, and agreement with, 
Restatement principles, even when such principles have their genesis in a minority rule, would 
assist the ALI with its own mission and would also ensure that litigants have an opportunity to 
see change at the Restatement level sooner than over a period of decades. Accordingly, with this 
improvement in mind, it may be best to view possible adjustments to the Restatement process in 
a less stringent and arranged form: typically, new Restatements are issued after an adoption 
period of thirty or forty years to respond to adjustments in law and practice. Having provisional 
reports that measure the actual impact, from the perspective of litigants, on issues such as 
recovery would allow the Restatements’ minority provisions to be more responsive to judicial 
needs. Further, this would comport with the ALI’s emphasis on stating what the law is at a given 
time. While it may be impractical to completely revise and issue new Restatements on an annual 
basis, a regular assessment and amendment to more controversial opinions—informed by their 
adoption at the state level—would do much to serve judicial clarity and ensure that the law is 
responsive to legal developments at the state level. 
These two remedies, though by no means conclusive, could serve within the scope of the 
ALI’s mission to ensure that the law is stated and developed with an understanding of the 
inherent need by judicial actors for clarity and transparency in their decisions. Likewise, when 
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the ALI considers the adoption of legal principles drawn from minority rules or dissenting 
opinions, the normal review process should be supplemented by a mechanism that can serve to 
adequately redress the disruption that such adoptions can prompt. In other words, if the common 
law is to be upended, any revision should be subject to additional review, perhaps by the 
formation of a standing committee within the ALI that can report before the release of the 
Restatement on the potential impact of rule changes that would supplant the existing common 
law. Adopting a measure with this focus would allow the ALI to retain control over the process 
while improving and furthering the transparency of the drafting process. This committee could 
also require a Restatement reporter who proposed the change from existing legal practice to 
actively defend and advocate his position before the committee, putting further scrutiny on the 
issue of revision and requiring greater consideration and care in the drafting process before 
advancing minority rule positions. This committee could also consider in the scope of its review 
unconventional sources, such as testimony and written memoranda from litigants’ themselves. 
This could be especially germane in cases that rely on the Restatements in assessing and 
determining an award of damages.  
All of these recommendations would broadly operate within the scope of the ALI’s 
mission without eliminating its purpose of promoting greater judicial uniformity. Indeed, 
revisions to the Restatement process should not be viewed with trepidation. Instead, the ALI can 
best serve the legal community when it is responsive to the needs of its primary audience: judges 
and other judicial actors at the state level who rely on the Restatements to clarify the law and, in 
some cases, provide uniformity to its decisions. Likewise, a revision to the Restatement policy 
and process with targeted action around the adoption of minority rules and dissenting opinions 
would ameliorate the concerns of litigants, especially when those provisions have a direct impact 
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on their recovery options. In all respects, these suggestions for policy change are uniform in their 
support for a Restatement that is as inclusive as possible in its construction and focus on an 
outcome that demonstrates that the ALI can effectively achieve its policy aims. They are 
likewise guided by the fact that the Restatement cannot be understood as the process of one 
individual or even one interest group. Rather, as we have demonstrated, the Restatement process 
relies on incorporating a variety of interests and concerns. These measures could provide the 
balance necessary in order to ensure that different interests are represented and that particular 
interests are not prioritized over another.   
In some respects, it may seem easier to suggest that the Restatements adhere to the 
limited purpose of stating the law as it is. There are, however, compelling arguments, given the 
ALI’s diverse membership, for on occasion adopting minority rules and advancing certain legal 
concerns with an eye toward equity and efficiency. However, any steps that would tend to limit 
or otherwise supplant the existing common law practice or majority preference in judicial 
decisions should be accompanied by a strong, deliberative process that focuses on the meaning 
imparted by a minority rule adoption: that the law needs to be changed for the better, and that 
existing dissenting opinions afford strong justification to suggest that the prevailing view is 
incorrect. A transparent revision that explains this reasoning cannot be achieved by a 
Restatement reporter alone, nor can it be adequately resolved effectively within the current ALI 
structure for drafting Restatements. Instead, to remedy these concerns and increase transparency, 
the ALI should consider revisions to the drafting process that acknowledge the contention around 
the adoption of minority rules. Doing so would, truly, afford the clarity around advancements in 
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legal uniformity that are critical to the fostering of public trust and faith in the Restatements as 




















240 Despite these concerns, the author does feel that the ALI has the capacity and ability to proceed forward with 
reformation. Historically, it has undertaken such efforts before (with Herbert Wechsler) and it shall undoubtedly 
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A Note on Typefaces: 
The chapters of this thesis are set in Times New Roman, a standard serif typeface in the 
Roman family designed for the Times of London newspaper in 1929 by Stanley Morison. Today 
the gold standard for academic writing, it has been at times called ubiquitous and bland. In his 
memoir on typography, A Tally of Types, Morison observed that in considering its design, he 
wondered what William Morris (the designer of the ITC Golden Type font) would think of 
Times New Roman, remarking that “as a new face it should, by the grace of God and the art of 
man, have been broad and open, generous and ample; instead, by the vice of Mammon and the 
misery of the machine, it is bigoted and narrow, mean and puritan.” The font remains particularly 
popular with newspapers in a nod to its origins.  
 
The title page and headings of this thesis are set in Goudy Old Style, with chapter headings 
underlined and set in Goudy Old Style Italic. Goudy (or GOS) is an old-style serif font designed by 
American type designer Frederic W. Goudy for American Type Founders in 1915. Inspired by the 
Italian Renaissance, the font is also individualistic, with its eccentric upward facing “g” and 
diamond dots above the “i” and “j” and clever, gentle swells at the base of “E” and “L.” The italic 
form was completed by Goudy in 1918. Today, the font is especially popular in luxury magazines, 
and has been the font of choice in distinguished publications such as Harper’s (formerly Harper’s 
New Monthly Magazine) in the twentieth century. The font also finds regular use among those 
remaining bastions of American correspondence manufacture (such as Crane) It might best be 
termed “graceful” or, as Goudy himself described the font, it is “book letter with strong serifs, firm 
hairlines, and makes a solid, compact page.” Truly though, the use of the font here is perhaps a coy 
nod to the future publishing ambitions of the author and his recent predilection with typographic 
history.  
 
 
 
